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FINAL REPORT

European Leadership in Culture, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID)

February 2019



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Acronyms

AAAS – the American Association for the Advancement of Science	GAVI – the Vaccine Alliance
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations	H2020 – The European Union Horizon 2020 Programme
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa	ICR – international cultural relations
CDP – Cultural Data Project	JRC – Joint Research Centre
CULT – European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education	ERC – European Research Council
DG – Directorate-General	KNETs – knowledge networks
DG DEVCO – International Cooperation and Development	MFAs – Ministry(ies) of Foreign Affairs
DG EAC – Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture	NGOs – Non-governmental Organizations
DG NEAR – European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations	PRIMA – the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area
DG RTD – Directorate-General Research and Innovation	R&I – Research and Innovation
EACEA – Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency	REA – Research Executive Agency
EASME – the Executive Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises	S&T – Science & Technology
EEAS – the European External Action Service	SDGs – the Sustainable Development Goals
EL-CSID – European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy	SESAME – Synchrotron-Light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East
ERA – European Research Area	SFIC – the Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation
EU – the European Union	STAC – Science and Technology Advisory Council
EUNIC – European Union National Institutes for Culture	STI – Science, Technology and Innovation
FPI – Foreign Policy Instruments	TGNs – trans-governmental policy networks
G20 – Group of Twenty	TRL – Technology Readiness Level
G8 – Group of Eight	UK – the United Kingdom
GAFA – Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple	UN – the United Nations
	UNESCO – the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
	US – the United States
	WHO – World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

The Horizon 2020 (H2020) research programme, *European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy* (EL-CSID) was conducted between February 2016 and February 2019, in the context of the H2020 programme on *Europe as a Global Actor*. This final report identifies the research undertaken, its findings and recommendations. But it is intended as more than simply a factual account of EL-CSID research. It also aspires to be a state-of-the-art analysis of contemporary European cultural and science diplomacy.

The Commission's Call for research into the nature of European cultural and science diplomacy was launched in early 2015 and it is important to note the assumptions that clearly underwrote its view of the EU and its role in the world at that time of its inception. The Call was inspired, amongst other things, by (i) the 2014 *Preparatory Action Report on Culture in the European Union's External Relations: Engaging the World: Towards Cultural Global Citizenship* (EU, 2014) and (ii) a recognition within the Commission of the need for science collaboration to address the world's societal and global challenges identified in the 2014 Report of the EU President's Science and Technology Council (EC, 2014). Both reports were upbeat about the potential of both cultural and science diplomacy, although strategies for their development were in their infancy.

It seemed then, that in the words of the Call, we were in an age of “unprecedented transformation and *growing global interdependence*” (our italics). The Call reflected little awareness of the dramatic changes in contemporary politics and international relations hiding around the corner. Research, it argued, should focus on the strength of Europe's culture and values and the major role they should and could play in the governance of this global interdependence, supporting the liberal international order and bolstering Europe's crucial role in that order. Implicit in the Call was a further assumption, namely that so-called “soft power” diplomacy, initially enunciated by Joseph Nye (2004) and embodied in a growing salience of cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy, could join more traditional, material (security and economic) hard power understandings of diplomacy.

The EL-CSID proposal, written between May and August 2015, set itself three core objectives:

1. To detail and analyse the manner in which the EU operates in the domains of culture, science and innovation diplomacy;
2. To examine the degree to which cultural and science diplomacy might enhance the interests of the EU in the contemporary world order with a view to strengthening EU policy towards the use of science and culture in its wider diplomacy;
3. To deepen European scholarly understanding of diplomacy as a central and abiding, if changing, institution of international relations.

While these objectives remained, the socio-political and economic policy environments in which the project proceeded were undergoing significant change. The prospects for the EU to establish a central role for both science diplomacy and cultural diplomacy as the “soft core” of its external relations became more difficult to articulate and practice than prior to the commencement of EL-CSID. The European foreign policy community up to the appearance of EU's 2016 *Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy* (EU, 2016a) assumed that the international order was, at its bedrock, a *liberal* order. Moreover, EU policy evinced in the *Global Strategy* further assumed that the fundamentals of a liberal world order, if somewhat bruised, remained intact and that the EU is a major player in that order.

But with the changing economic and socio-political contexts these assumptions have become increasingly challenged at a time when they become more salient than at any time in the past. The importance of culture and science diplomacy—as facilitators of new EU external policies bringing actors together within the EU across the spectrum (from national institutes for culture and member state chief scientific advisors, international organisations in the field of science through to the Commission and the EEAS)—has grown considerably. Challenges in the cultural field are to be found in the growth of identitarianism and the ‘culturisation of politics’ (Rose, 2017). In the field of science: STI and foreign policy science diplomacy has become inextricably linked to addressing today's global policy challenges (especially those identified in the Sustainable Development Goals—SDGs.)

What follows in this report is a detailed discussion of these trends, both European and global, and the forces that have structured the work of the EL-CSID teams, followed by discussion of its individual research packages, the themes emerging across these packages and their specific findings.

Recommendations

INTERNAL – STREAMLINING – EU&MS

- Clarifying the roles of the EEAS, EUNIC
- Dialogue with EU member states on both science (SFIC) and culture (EUNIC?) and clarification of roles, supportive role, added value an EU strategy can bring
- Real strategies need to be backed by funding. Both science ‘diplomacy’ and cultural ‘diplomacy’ should be built into the mission approach of Horizon Europe
- For science, that means a preparatory action and bringing together DG RTD and EEAS

INTERNAL – BRUSSELS & THE EU

- Training, new practices, skills, potentially linked with the universities
- The evolving activity across the spectrum from international cultural relations through to state driven cultural diplomacy should be mapped (EEAS, EUNIC, non-official civil society actors)
- Closing the science – policy gap & more involvement of the private sector
- Avoid ‘winner takes all’ sectors. Large concentrations of commercial and technological powers can lead to vulnerable (inter) dependencies.

INTERNAL → EXTERNAL

- Nation/ region branding is complex and does not necessarily lead to nation/ region building. It can also backfire or make no impact at all. The policy shift towards ‘policy branding’ in discrete areas, however, might give the EU a good way to rejuvenate its reputation as a regional value-based model.
- Keep spreading the message of ‘open science’, whilst identifying and protecting the unique strengths critical for the functioning of the EU’s economy and society and its international negotiating position.
 - strengthens both internal and external cohesion
 - contributing to the SDG’s also helps spreading our societal values and goals

EXTERNAL

- Ensure that calls for regional cooperation spread further than the capitals, and that the benefits of long-term cooperation are reflected (otherwise, regional approaches may cause competition). Allocate more resources to inter-regional approaches and more involvement of the private sector.
- Digital engagement always better than one-way messaging.
- When working with external countries/ regions, ensure that:
 - Sensitivity to local cultures is ensured
 - There is no impression of a hidden agenda
 - Co-ownership is encouraged, instead of a north-south implementation
 - Common culture and heritage is highlighted
 - Not only capitals and the usual beneficiaries are involved (de-centralisation)

Introduction

A Changing Global Context for EL-CSID

Within six months of the research for EL-CSID commencing, several global economic and political factors combined to create a more challenging environment for Europe's science and cultural diplomacy.

The populist national urge – defined by EL-CSID as the *populist nationalist zeitgeist* (PNZ, see Higgott and Proud 2017) – whilst seeded in the time of the global financial crisis of 2008, began to gather serious momentum across Europe from 2015. The massive influx of refugees from the conflict in Syria fed a growing hostility to migration in general and migration from Muslim majority countries in particular. This hostility was intensified by acts of terrorism in Europe during 2016-17. These events have led to the rise of identitarian politics and the growing articulation of “culture wars”. They were also exacerbated by other factors such as:

- I. A backlash against economic globalization (especially resistance to liberal economic openness and the rise of protectionism in trade) gathering momentum on both sides of the Atlantic in 2016
- II. The UK vote to leave the European Union
- III. The strident nationalist “Make America Great Again” rhetoric of Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States.

All three have carried attendant adverse implications for the successful pursuit of European international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy (see Higgott and Proud, 2017). In both cultural and science domains another unfortunate characteristic of the PNZ has been the growing rhetoric against cosmopolitan elites and “experts” in general and the accompanying attacks on knowledge, truth and scientific evidence in particular (see Nicholls, 2017).

Much EL-CSID research has worked with an assumption that the discourse, and indeed the effects of the PNZ is becoming normalised, especially since the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump. Furthermore, our work has suggested that these normalising tendencies are not likely to be rolled back in the short-term. Within the EU, despite the populists' 2017-18 electoral setbacks in the Netherlands, Germany and France, the nationalist and Euro-sceptic political discourse has continued to grow. Furthermore, the continued illiberal policies and practice of ruling parties in countries such as Hungary and Poland have identified a lack of political will amongst Europe's leaders—not to mention effective mechanisms and capacity—to enforce member states' commitments to uphold EU liberal values.

This new landscape threatens the liberal democratic values, norms and practices that the EU has sought, and continues to seek, to promote in international affairs. Further, in what can be described as an emerging nationalist world order, the avenues and opportunities for soft power influence are increasingly challenged and constrained. In light of this, two important general points should now be made.

Firstly, the prospects for the EU to establish a central role for both science diplomacy and cultural diplomacy as the “soft core” of its external relations have become more difficult now than they were in the heady days of the introduction of these initiatives prior to the commencement of EL-CSID. Secondly, while the *Global Strategy* statement also acknowledged that 2016 was a time of “existential crisis” for the EU in its relationship to the global order (EU, 2016a: 9), EL-CSID researchers understood that this new reality did not negate the importance of, and the need for, proactive science and cultural diplomacy. Indeed, the judgment was made that in this dramatically deteriorating international environment, the EU's ability to take a key role in the enhancement of international cultural relations and to support consolidation of global science cooperation, was even more important than when the Call was written.

Cultural diplomacy, or what the key actors in the EC, EEAS and EUNIC prefer to call international cultural relations, has made progress towards becoming firmer public policy backed by the Commission, the Parliament and the member states in the Council. Indeed, a ‘strategic approach’ for enhanced cooperation at the EU level is anticipated in the second half of 2019 (Council of the EU, 2018). On the other hand, support for science diplomacy has remained mostly a buzzword connected with DG RTD's plan to internationalise H2020 and Horizon Europe actions (especially the ideal of open science and addressing the global challenges, including the Sustainable Development Goals).

It is within this changing global and European context that EL-CSID has conducted its research, underwritten by a twofold acknowledgment, one normative and one practical. On the one hand, that the

identification and articulation of strategies to enhance EU cultural and science diplomacy remain a normatively defensible addition to the EU's approach to international relations and thus important in an applied policy context. On the other hand, however, reality dictates that in practice the pursuit of international cultural relations/cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy will be increasingly and inevitably constrained by the more atavistic and combative international environment we have identified. This position applies for both the EL-CSID researchers and the community of public policy practitioners in both Brussels and member state capitals. Indeed, and as will be seen, one of the findings of our research is that in a world of increasingly post liberal international relations, the faith placed by many in the Brussels policy community in culture and science as instruments of EU soft power at times seems excessively aspirational. Indeed, a further finding, and a problem addressed in the report, is that the notion of soft power, with its near ubiquitous status and invariably uncritical usage, confuses more than it clarifies. So, at this stage, some justifications for this contextually negative discussion needs to be presented.

Firstly, at a practical level, EU strategy for both cultural and science diplomacy *over-estimated* the nature of change in the institution of diplomacy in the 21st century. Sure, we are in an era of the so-called *new* diplomacy where non-traditional agents, especially civil society, cultural agents and scientific actors (individuals, institutions and networks) play a greater role than in the past and EL-CSID research amply demonstrates this. But the core principles of diplomacy proper—state communication *under considerations of force and power*—remain the principal determinants of successful diplomatic practice (Jonsson, 2007). Equally, our research demonstrates that attempts to establish soft power diplomacy as an independent, or at least semi-autonomous, pillar of external international action separate from the traditional material foreign policy and security domains of diplomatic practice are, at the very least, challenging (Higgott and Van Langenhove, 2016).

Secondly, most forms of diplomacy in the external relations of the EU, including culture and science, remain legally a member state competence with Brussels having only a supporting competence. Cognisant of potential resistance to a push for a more collective EU diplomatic activity among member states, Brussels-based champions have largely foresworn the notion of a joined-up strategy for cultural and/or science *diplomacy* with their attendant state-driven goal-oriented implications, in favour of more nuanced approaches, albeit less easily defined or articulated. As noted, cultural policymakers prefer and refer to a strategic approach to *international cultural relations* (ICR) rather than cultural diplomacy. In the science and innovation sectors, talk of a specific EU jurisdiction in diplomatically inclined science international relations is even more muted. Further, while some thought and activity has been given to the creation of frameworks for the development and management of the EU's cultural and scientific relations, and structures to secure buy-in from wider stakeholders, on one test of the worth of a policy—the provision of financial support—Brussels has been slow committing major resources to either sets of activities.

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, at the level of both strategy and practice, the prospects for success of a strategy to grow EU external influence through cultural and science diplomacy beyond the jurisdiction of its member states, however well intentioned, or necessary, runs counter to the global surge in nationalism and consequent trends in international relations. In the current era, the tendency is to privilege hard power over soft power in foreign policy—with an added preference for bilateral transactional diplomacy over multilateral institutional diplomacy. These sentiments run counter to those outlined in the EU's 2016 *Global Strategy* for its engagement with the global order and the enhancement of its international relations via the use of culture and science.

Although much attention is given in EL-CSID to the impact of the PNZ and its implications, it is only one of several global trends that have proved to be of significance over the course of the project. Issues such as climate, food and water security and the implication of an aging population are just some of the escalating societal challenges that require cross border collaboration and risk management, and where the EU will play a vital role. We highlight in the Report three critical areas relevant to the EU's future practice of culture and science diplomacy that we have looked at during the life of EL-CSID;

- (i) *A new diffused power environment.* At the very least we are seeing a diminution of US hegemonic power and the declining role of longstanding institutional instruments of US led multilateral cooperation (the formal institutions of the UN system and the IFTIs and the less formalised G7/8 and G20 structure). These changes are exacerbated by Great Power competition—notably between the USA on the one hand and China and Russia on the other.
- (ii) *The growing importance of Data and Interconnectedness.* The impact of big data, social media and the rise of individual and grass roots empowerment on international interactions.

- (iii) *A Technological Step Change.* A new industrial revolution driven by new globally rapidly scalable technologies are having a major impact on diplomacy.

All three factors are changing the manner in which international relations are conducted. Hybridity in international politics is becoming the order of the day. New international non-state actors, civil society actors and networks, corporations (Big Pharma, Big Ag, GAFAs etc.) and even individuals (Bill and Melinda Gates, George Soros and other “celebratory diplomats”) are increasingly influential actors in the global order (see Cooper et al, 2013 and Kerr and Wiseman, 2015). In the recent metaphor developed by Anne-Marie Slaughter (2018), international politics is conducted not only on a chessboard by states, but also on the web by our hybrid community of actors. For Slaughter, “webcraft” as a generic activity—covering all elements of social and technological interaction and communication—is as important as statecraft.

Looking across the research conducted by EL-CSID it can be seen that these trends provide both challenges and opportunities for the EU’s international relations in the cultural and scientific domains. As our research and this report identifies, particular areas for attention include:

- EU policies lagging the pace of change in society, science and technology.
- Low current capability/capacity to adapt diplomatic efforts to a more diffused power environment extending beyond traditional structures and tools.
- The relationship between H2020 ideals of ‘open to the world’ and growing nationalist tendencies antithetical to openness.

On the positive side of the balance sheet, ICR, cultural diplomacy and science diplomacy, if implemented skilfully, offer opportunities to build new alliances for the future with neighbouring and emerging countries alike. ICR, for instance, is central to development policies. Similarly, in the science domain, most EU flagship projects are in the developing world, for example, the Synchrotron-Light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME), the Partnership for Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA) and the relatively new BLUEMED Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (BLUEMED SRIA). It will also provide some necessary clarity in this changing global context, on opportunities for the EU to engage the fields of culture, science and innovation as an exemplar of liberal values and as participant in global affairs.

A Short Discussion of Critical Terms

Diplomacy. The term diplomacy was extensively detailed in the EL-CSID application and will not be reiterated here. In this report it refers to actions, programmes and practices that pertain directly to, or bear a clear relationship to foreign policy objectives in general and EU objectives in particular. As noted in the Preamble, notwithstanding aspirations in Brussels, most forms of diplomacy in the external relations of the EU, including culture and science, remain a member state competence, with only a supporting competence given to Brussels. As discussed, documents that speak to the EU’s intentions in this area tend to avoid the term diplomacy and show a preference for international (cultural or scientific) relations to describe EU involvement in, or ambition for, both international scientific and cultural activities. This precision is required to ensure the EU is not perceived as trying to overreach and does have important taxonomical implications, but it hides the manner in which ICR can slide into cultural diplomacy on the back of official input or funding. This is the essential dilemma for those in the policy community who would seek to concretise this distinction.

Put perhaps more simply, and sidestepping the linguistic obfuscation noted in the previous paragraph, the EU desires its international relationships to be strengthened, and its standing and influence in global political and economic affairs increased, through the progressive use of culture and science programmes. Accordingly, where possible, this report privileges the term international relations to reflect the EU’s own language regarding its stated objectives. But in reporting exchanges with other actors, the term diplomacy has been used interchangeably with that of international relations. This is not intended to suggest that Brussels is pursuing a specific foreign policy objective beyond its competence; the term should be understood in the context in which it is used. It is also important to clarify that mere engagement in international exchange or collaboration between practitioners of various nations does not automatically infer ‘diplomacy’ or ‘international cultural relations’ in the manner contemplated in this Report.

Culture. Culture is intrinsic to many areas of international relations. No simple definition of culture can possibly prove acceptable to interested scholars and practitioners reading this report. Awareness and sensitivity in both institutional and interpersonal dealings, including the inevitable exchange of cultural

norms and ideas are, to a greater or lesser degree, important to the success of soft power initiatives in health, education, science. It may also be argued in the reverse, that in the protocols and practices of non-culture specific initiatives, cultural norms and values are implicitly communicated. While EL-CSID researchers acknowledge the transverse nature of culture, the research focus (unless otherwise specified) is with activities and initiatives to gain or exert influence, with culture as its primary focus.

For the purposes of this report and from the perspective of the actors engaged in EU ICR, culture is a flexible and open-ended concept not limited simply to the arts and cultural industries. EU programmes and policies that define a broad idea of culture and its use in external relations go well beyond the concept of cultural diplomacy as a state driven tool for merely showcasing values and practices of national prestige. Education is often included in the identification of the cultural domain. Indeed, in the *Preparatory Action Report* (EU, 2014) the role of higher education providers in enhancing the cultural attraction of the EU was explicitly recognised. However, education it is not referred to in any significant manner in the subsequent *Joint Communication; Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations* (EC, 2016). For the purpose of EL-CSID research, culture is given a wide definition, extending to activities both structural and informal across the breadth of the arts, media, heritage, language and education.

Science (Diplomacy). Science as contemplated by the EU science programmes is a broad term that embraces the natural and social sciences and describes a wide variety of international engagements. Given the recency of science diplomacy as a field of study and investigation, the ideas and definitions currently in use to describe science in a diplomatic context are still in development. The American Association for the Advancement of Science and the UK Royal Society provided us with the first serious approach at providing a taxonomy of science diplomacy (2010):

- **Diplomacy for Science** exists where classical tools of diplomacy support the scientific and technological community, to establish cooperation agreements at government or institutional level. The goal of diplomacy for science actions is to benefit from foreign science and technology capacity in order to improve the national capacity.
- **Science in Diplomacy** exists where scientists support foreign policy. In times of war this has resulted in mobilizing national scientific and technological resources for the development of arms. In times of peace this is about improving foreign policy actions through the use of scientific knowledge.
- **Science for Diplomacy** goes one step further: here science is used as a tool to build and improve relations between states, for example, when there are tensions in relations between certain states or when states are faced with common problems that they cannot solve on their own. Scientific collaboration creates relationships that are based upon a non-ideological basis. The goal is here to support foreign policy actions by mobilizing scientific networks.

The continued relevance and potential for this taxonomy is considered further in this report. In general, science diplomacy can be regarded as a tool that can be used by states who in an instrumental way use science and scientists to pursue foreign policy goals. This may be to promote the national interests or solving problems impacting the state. But scientists themselves can also initiate activities that could be regarded as science diplomacy; intentionally, with awareness of foreign policy goals, or undertaking scientific activities with unintended diplomatic effects. Thus, it is a concept helpful for labelling ongoing activities as being of a diplomatic nature, or to qualify policy actions in a certain way. In other words, science diplomacy can refer to both practices and discourses.

It is within this context that the practice of science diplomacy has expanded considerably over the past few years as it has gained a more prominent role in policy discourses and academic research. This can be related to its perceived advantages within the modern diplomatic toolkit. The major strength associated with science diplomacy revolves around the role of scientists, whose engagement in international cooperation is regarded as a bridge for building trust between states and ameliorating inter-state disputes or tensions. Often, this belief is accompanied by an idealistic discourse of scientists all speaking the “same language,” able to bring people together, even in polarized conflict zones. As such, science diplomacy is often portrayed as a tool for peace-building and reconciliation, though it is not always able to perform these functions. Success stories, such as the involvement of nuclear physicists in the nuclear deal with Iran and the P5+1 and the EU, demonstrate how science has contributed to the mitigation of international conflicts and tensions.

It should also be noted that although culture and science are often referred to collectively in discussions of soft power, including in this report, they possess distinctive attributes and challenges are not

overlooked. While both may be instruments of soft power, culture is intrinsic to all nations as a function of their identity. Science, as an area of developed expertise and capability, has by contrast become increasingly internationalised, and the value of collaboration, multi-nation projects and agreed international standards is today well understood among practitioners in most developed and developing nations. Value can be attributed to science and scientific efforts on a spectrum from instruments of reputation enhancement and goodwill building, to high value assets in trade and security negotiations. For this reason, engaging in science as a diplomatic endeavour, particularly in an environment such as the EU's 'open to the world' policy, carries additional risks and consequences, particularly in the event of engagement with a bad actor, with potential for intellectual property disputes and corporate espionage.

Innovation (diplomacy). Innovation diplomacy encompasses the concept and practice of bridging distance and other divides (cultural, socio- economic, technological, etc.) with focused and properly targeted initiatives to connect ideas and solutions with markets and investors ready to appreciate them and nurture them to their full potential (AAAS & the Royal Society, 2010). More than science diplomacy, it is linked to what is sometimes called economic diplomacy with its focus on building national gains in trade, investment, technology, etc. by diplomatic means. Following the above categorisation, innovation diplomacy should mainly, but not exclusively, be seen as diplomacy for innovation. It is closely linked to, or part of, trade and foreign economic policy.

Jurisdiction. In conjunction with discussions regarding the EU's competence in culture and science diplomacy, or international relations, we have occasionally also found it convenient to use the term jurisdiction. Although this term also has a precise legal meaning, we use it in this report to refer to the agreed ability for EU to act independently and/or represent member states, whether by virtue of competence conferred by the Lisbon Treaty, or as a result of some other negotiated agreement or permission between the EU and member states.

Leadership. EL-CSID's approach over the preceding three years has been to frame leadership as a question, considering the indicators of *willingness* to act as leader, *capacity* to act as leader and *acceptance* of the leadership actions by followers and external actors. These indicators were initially developed for assessing EU regional actions (see Zwartjes, Van Langenhove, Kingah & Maes, 2012) however they are applicable to a more general assessment of the Brussels policy community as a putative leader in culture and science diplomacy that finds fuller discussion in the Conclusion to this report.

Research and Project Overview

EL-CSID's research consortium drew its expertise from seven countries, and thirty five researchers working within nine institutions; Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) (Belgium), The University of Warwick (UoW) (UK), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) (Germany), Evro-Sredozemska Univerza (EMUNI) (Slovenia), Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques (CEDS.) (Turkey), the Joint Institute for Innovation Policy (JIIP) (Spain and Belgium), United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) (Belgium), the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Nazarbayev University (Kazakhstan) and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore (NUS) (Singapore).

The research was undertaken in six Work Packages (WPs), designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the EU as an international actor in the domains of culture and science diplomacy with an accompanying perspective from some of Europe's partners and neighbours. It included several deep dives into EU and international practice of culture, science and innovation diplomacy. Specifically, the individual work package focus was as follows:

Work Package 1 – European cultural and science diplomacy within a wider, theoretical, analytical and applied comparative context.

Work Package 2 – An applied policy analysis considering sovereign priorities in Europe-wide science and innovation policy for different states, public bodies and transnational actors.

Work Package 3 – Investigating the transnational collaborative dynamic in cultural and science diplomacy and particularly the rapid expansion in the activities of private actors and international organisations and networks.

Work Package 4 – Understanding the external perspective of the EU as an actor in culture and science diplomacy and investigate EU initiatives in cultural and science diplomacy from the outside looking in.

Work Package 5 – To map and analyse the role of EU institutions and various specialised agencies in using science, cultural and innovation diplomacy in the promotion of regional and inter-regional cooperation processes in the developing world.

Work Package 6 – Evaluating and promoting EU cultural and science diplomacy in practice, including translating research outcomes into policy recommendation and actions.

Research was conducted in a comparative context using a wide variety of methodologies, including extensive desk research of available scholarly and analytical documentation related to the field, interviews and surveys with practitioners, policymakers, government representatives and direct engagement with local populations. Detail regarding methodologies can be found in the relevant research reports, listed in Annex 2.

Finally, it is necessary to note one significant change to EL-CSID's research agenda. The Lee Kuan Yew School (LKY) of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore had responsibility for undertaking research on Asia. Absence of funding inhibited the empirical research although we have produced a couple of papers for the project. For reasons we fully appreciate LKY/SPP only partially fulfilled its obligations although it did host a panel of papers on science and cultural diplomacy of 5 EL-CSID members during the June 2017 *International Conference on Public Policy*. In agreement with REA, Task 5 was replaced by a new set of responsibilities that were undertaken by the Kazakh partners at Nazarbayev University. This led to new directions in research, tasks and in output; a redirection of research on 'Comparison of the EU and its member states with other major, active global players in cultural and science diplomacy'.

There have been other minor changes as research developed and new possibilities emerged. More research on diaspora relations was conducted than was initially envisaged in the grant application and this has replaced research into cultural relations via UNESCO and/or the Council of Europe.

Key Findings: An Overview

Seeking Cultural Identity for the EU; Beyond "Unity in Diversity"

A subject for much discussion in the field of international relations in general and cultural diplomacy in particular is the identification and desirability of a shared EU cultural identity; always a difficult, some would say impossible, task. Moreover, should EU expansion continue, it will only become more difficult to identify a single communicable identity that connects nations and citizens of the EU around a homogeneous set of shared values. For the time being what is offered, in the words of the *Global Strategy*, is "unity in diversity" with its embedded virtues of tolerance and openness. But it is fair to ask how such an ideal can be rendered meaningful and motivating, in a time of growing nationalist intolerance of the "other". But perhaps a more pertinent question here is how would a common cultural identity, an "EU brand" if you will, be of operational utility, in either the short or longer term, to EU institutions and member states in their practical pursuit of enhanced international relations?

At a practical level, from the perspective of programme recipients in neighbouring regions, EL-CSID findings often show a lack of appreciation of the difference between the EU, 'Europe', and member states acting individually. Indeed, it could be argued that it is of little negative, and potentially positive consequence if partners and participants equate dealings with a member state in culture or science, to dealings with 'Europe'. Neither does the evidence suggest that member states have been overly concerned to coordinate programmes or participation in culture or science events for purposes of presenting a united European front (Collins and Bekenova, 2018).

On the other hand, EL-CSID researchers found evidence of a desire to locate an EU identity in areas in which a united identity might be of assistance, including greater resources and proactivity on the part of EU delegations. From an external perspective, 'EU identity' is recognised as a challenge for the EU, faced with competing and often conflicting agendas within its member states. From a Turkish perspective, for example, where 'European identity' is particularly topical given the lengthy and tumultuous accession process, there is a clear desire to understand a united European culture serving common interests (see Senocak, 2018).

EL-CSID's research in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods also found that in external engagements, partners sought an understanding of a common EU identity (see WP 5). It is arguable however, that the core issue is one of clarity of message and consistent communication of intentions and values, rather than identity *per se*. This arises at two levels, firstly, in how the EU wishes itself to be perceived beyond the lack of consensus and critical political decisions of some member states in the face of the European migrant crisis and perceived hypocrisy in the application of values regarding

human rights (Senocak, 2018). Secondly, its accessibility in terms of clear processes in its external engagement. The focus and the practical utility that EU delegations and institutions might offer both member states and external partners is in the development of a consistency of coordination, communication and promotion of opportunities for member states to act jointly, rather than severally, in external relations.

Although the issue of identity frequently arises in the wider EU cultural conversation, it may merely be a distraction from more pressing issues. It is unlikely that the EU, under any circumstance, will or indeed could deliver a 'cultural identity' from the top down. In today's digital world of mass communication and rapid information dispersal at community level cultural identity, or rather a perception of identity is in the hands of the wider national populaces. If such an identity is to emerge, it will derive over time from consistency of message, programme protocols, practices and relationships of its representatives.

With rising nationalism, however, it cannot and should not be assumed that a 'common identity', or sense of what it means to be European in an EU context, is the same as a commitment to the liberal values assumed to be widely present in much EU international advocacy. Cultural identity and political ideology are separate beasts and in adverse times such as the present PNZ, the EU must communicate to all citizens and partners the societal benefits of the European project, especially the rights and freedoms inherent in liberal values. If the EU really wishes to defend EU values, it should do so with vigour. We are in danger of forgetting the significance and importance of the positive messages at the heart of the EU story to-date.

In this context, culture and science, and especially the importance of scientific evidence as a tool for policy making in this time of contest, must be central to relations within the EU: both *within* EU member states, *between* them and EU institutions and *between* institutions and citizens. By extension, the development of successful EU international cultural relations and science diplomacy must also rely on a stronger internal engagement in these domains. This message has become progressively important in the work of EL-CSID over the last three years

Competence, Capability, Capacity: The Practicalities of EU Culture and Science Diplomacy

Without direct competence it is a challenge to achieve a common/consistent narrative and alignment around a core EU strategy for either culture or science diplomacy. If it, or something close to it, is to be achieved, the onus is on the EU to define a workable and acceptable socio-political jurisdiction within which in to "support, coordinate or supplement the actions of member states" (Article 6, Lisbon Treaty). In science, competence is embedded in how S&T policy is dealt with in the European treaties; in effect this permits research and technological development in parallel and ideally coordinated with the activities of member state as identified in Van Langenhove's 'Tools for Science Diplomacy' (2017).

At a practical level this gives rise to specific challenges such as managing the EU's priorities versus member states' and the provision of resources available to support EU initiatives. Varying levels of resource are allocated to culture and science diplomacy by member states, however the disparity appears more marked in the provision for science and innovation. Given the relative recency of science diplomacy as a policy concern, many member states lack even a basic structure or instruments linking science and foreign policy. EL-CSID researchers have mapped the capability and capacity for science diplomacy across member states (see Turekian, 2018), and have found that while some member states do have government resources allocated to science and innovation, many do not set specific foreign policy objectives for scientific collaboration or international scientific engagement, nor engage at the policy level with their senior scientist or major science programmes. The exceptions appear to be twofold, in member states such as Germany, that identify strongly as a knowledge economy, or where science is being targeted as a political tool, such as the current Hungarian government's controversial interference in the research agenda and operations of its Academy of Sciences (Science Business, 2018) or Spain, where scientists argue that government policies intrude excessively into their science communities' international relations (Moro-Martin, 2017).

Whether or not member states are sufficiently resourced for effective cultural or science diplomacy is a serious policy consideration. Current analysis suggests there are important areas where the EU (via say the EEAS, EAC or other DGs) may add value to member state activities in cultural and science relations. For this to occur, an acceptable negotiated, albeit informal, jurisdictional compact is required. There is evidence to suggest that in the area of international cultural relations progress is being made, especially in the discussions between the EC, EEAS and EUNIC. A key, but as yet unresolved issue, however, is the degree to which it is possible for the various public, private and civil society agencies engaged in international cultural relations to be recipients of financial support from EU and

simultaneously remain autonomous rather than drift along the spectrum from ICR to cultural diplomacy. At the time of the preparation of this report this remains an ongoing and unresolved issue.

Given imbalances in member state capabilities, there is a role for the EU in enhancement of culture and science diplomacy. This might include the following areas:

- Coordination of member state activity and messaging where a cohesive and coordinated image is necessary;
- Setting benchmarks and standards for world class practices in culture and science diplomacy;
- Addressing the uneven capability across member states, especially enhancing training and skills for Europeans engaging in culture and science diplomacy and related work.

This becomes even more critical with mounting global, societal and environmental challenges that require cross border collaboration and risk management. A relevant example of how the EU might operate is as a coordinating body, for example as a manager of development aid such as by the World Bank, with the launch in October 2018 of the multi-donor fund in support of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The aim of the Partnership Fund is to strengthen SDG implementation, including equipping countries with tools and best practices to achieve their sustainable development objectives.

The second opportunity arises from the new, emerging policy playing field identified by EL-CSID research. The growing influence of non-state actors in transnational policy communities beyond traditional state-state diplomacy, along with new structures, instruments and means of engagement, may provide a new jurisdiction for the EU to build soft power through culture, science and innovation. A third area, not specifically addressed within the EL-CSID mandate but worthy of future investigation, is the potential for the EU to engage directly with other regionally constituted institutionalised architectures (such as ASEAN) to emulate the European Commission’s initiatives on culture, science and innovation diplomacy and/or to build their own direct south to south relationship with like regional bodies, or the new breed of informal international organisations, such as the BRICS.

Notwithstanding its future direction, if the EU is to maximise its potential soft power via culture or science, it needs not only a clear and agreed set of strategic imperatives and an agreed jurisdiction, but also clarity of internal responsibility, coordination and accountability. The former is challenging enough, but without also addressing the latter, real progress will most likely be institutionally prohibitive. In developing an approach for culture in EU external relations, EU institutions have rapidly sought involvement of the member states and their cultural institutes, particularly through the EUNIC network, the Council and other bodies, with the aim of creating an enhanced multi-level cooperative structure. Science is less advanced in its policy and strategy formation, but it too currently engages through a complex, loosely coordinated group of institutions and stakeholders.

CULTURE				
DG EAC EACEA DG DEVCO DG NEAR FPI	EEAS HRVP Secretariat General EU delegations	Council of the EU Cultural Affairs Committee Foreign Affairs Council National institutes for culture Embassies (cultural attachés) Friends of the Presidency	European Parliament EUNIC Global More Europe	CULT AFET Culture practitioners European culture networks Independent cultural organisations
EUROPEAN COMMISSION	MEMBER STATES	NON-STATE ACTORS/ STAKEHOLDERS		
DG RTD SAM JRC ERC REA EASME	EEAS HRVP Secretariat General EU delegations	Council of the EU COMPET Foreign Affairs Council Embassies (science attachés) National research councils, academies and foundations	European universities, research centres (and their networks, research infrastructures) International scientific peer networks and organisations Industrial science and research companies and organisation Industry and community end-users	
SCIENCE				

Further consideration must be given to the dispersed allocation of responsibility and focus across the various DGs and official EU bodies and institutions, in order to effectively engage with firstly, member states and their various priorities, but secondly, the multiplicity of other internal and external organisations, actors and practitioners.

Regional Culture and Science Diplomacy: Challenges to Multilateral Engagement

If strategies and conceptualisations are still in the making, the EU has been increasingly developing cultural and science diplomacy practices with a regional relevance. Among the principal targets of these initiatives have been EU neighbourhood countries, addressed with regional and bilateral programmes and other initiatives in culture, higher education and science. While regional arrangements struggled to take off in the Eastern Neighbourhood, activity in the Euro-Mediterranean region has produced a better structured cooperation. The region has seen a proliferation of institutions and instruments for dialogue and exchange. Euromed cultural and youth programmes starting in the mid-nineties have been renewed through multiple phases and later substituted by similar instruments targeting civil society and governments in the ENP South. A similar cultural programme was created for the Eastern Neighbourhood, although resources were smaller and management more centralised. Research infrastructure projects such as SESAME, and more recently PRIMA, have been supported by the EU.

EL-CSID research highlights however that, EU rhetoric and existing programmes notwithstanding, neither culture nor science diplomacy have in fact moved centre stage in EU regional external relations and still constitute a relatively low priority, particularly with regard to the ENP and Central Asia. In this context then, one positive development was the Commission's commitment in its 2018 Communication, *A New European Agenda for Culture* (EC, 2018) to define regional strategies in the field of culture starting from the Western Balkans, the MENA region and Latin America. But until fully integrated into the EU's foreign policy strategies, including their regional dimensions, cultural and science diplomacy risk remaining an isolated policy. For this reason, we have argued that leveraging the attractiveness of its cultural and scientific sectors should be incorporated as tools of EU's soft power action, thereby distinguishing the Union from more traditional global powers.

Despite the EU's commitment to a regional approach, its scientific and cultural attractiveness has been found to work most effectively in bilateral settings. While this often has to do with general political tensions and historical grievances within the target regions, it has been noted that practical considerations also push countries towards preferring a bilateral engagement, influenced by perception of the EU as a donor—a source of money—rather than a partner. Indeed, funds provided bilaterally give greater negotiating room for recipient countries than regional funding. When it comes to knowledge and capability transfer and support, for e.g. technical assistance, scientific cooperation and education initiatives, direct learning from the EU is often perceived as more important than cooperation with neighbouring peer countries. For these reasons, region-to-region relations are with a few exceptions almost non-existent in the domestic policies of EU Neighbourhood countries.

While stronger region-to-region cooperation would support more equal partnerships with the developing world, in general, the EU's cultural and science diplomacy relations in its neighbourhoods still reflect asymmetrical donor-recipient relationships. This has negative implications on two fronts – strategic and practical. Strategically, EU cultural and science relationships clearly need to be rethought in the context of broader support to both national governments and civil society and policies created via regional cooperation and networking 'from the bottom' (via workshops and networking events) for cultural and scientific actors. Long-lasting capacity development in these sectors will only be achieved with the active inclusion of local governments in policy 'trialogues'. More political commitment and matching financial resources from partner countries, as partially achieved in some cases like the new born PRIMA initiative, are strongly needed in order to develop more equal and sustainable cooperation.

Practically, the perception of the EU as primarily a source of funds is problematic. To-date the aspirations for culture and science in the enhancement of regional cooperation have outpaced the resources mobilised to deliver them. For example, in the MENA region (the EU and southern neighbourhood countries), lives a population of roughly 700-800 million people. Here, the EU's broad objective includes achieving mutual understanding, bringing people closer together, and stabilising political tension, economic upheaval, violent radicalisation and migratory flows. This sizeable ambition is pursued with a variety of relatively small and fragmented programmes (see EL-CSID's MENA region programme mapping; Trobbiani, 2017). Complicating resource allocation, funding instruments last on average 3-5 years without a commitment for future assistance. The short-term nature of EU's support to cultural and scientific actors in developing countries thus clashes with the rhetoric of long-term capacity building and development (Trobbiani and Hatendoer, 2018). Future regional strategies must

address the gap between objectives and resources, or risk that cultural and science diplomacy become little more than buzzwords for strategic communications.

In positive developments however, there is increasing evidence of the potential, if as yet unrealised, innovative public-private solutions to advance public goods such as health and education. Also, the EU has made increasing use of blending instruments leveraging private investment in development cooperation in science, and cultural diplomacy that should be important here for future investments.

HIGHER EDUCATION AS DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA

While states are still the main entities responsible for answering global challenges, this cannot happen without science and science-based solutions that need the broader inclusion of non-state organisations and actors operating at all levels of governance. It needs a “culture of cooperation”—specifically between the public and private sectors. More strategic thinking is needed on the side of the EU on how to include the private sector in the provision of public goods. A precise example emanating from research conducted under the EL-CSID banner is provided by the challenges facing higher education in Africa, especially sub-Saharan, where enrolment rates lag behind all developing regions. Here, the EU still has yet to recognise the potential that international private provision of higher education could bring to the development of the continent. Notwithstanding good work done under the ERASMUS Scheme the EU has failed to support innovation in public private partnerships in Higher Education (see Higgott, 2018).

EU Cultural and Science Diplomacy Funding: Implications and Implementation

The question of EU funding cuts across all research areas addressed in the EL-CSID project. The ‘funding issue’ rears its head in most conversations around the EU’s investment in culture and science. It does not only pertain to sufficiency, it extends to expectations and receptivity on the part of external partners and the implications for EU programmes and recipients.

There is debate, even within the EL-CSID consortium, over the degree to which large funding programmes such as H2020, or Creative Europe are, or should be “disinterested” funding instruments rewarding excellence alone or specifically instruments of EU policy. EL-CSID’s research with participants and recipients, particularly those external to the EU, finds that the requirements inherent in the programme protocols and the focus of investment do, perhaps unsurprisingly, communicate EU values. There is also evidence from EL-CSID’s research in Kazakhstan that suggests (Collins & Bekenova forthcoming) that participation in EU affiliated projects is perceived to create a ‘halo effect’ for the local government, which seeks to portray itself as aligned to those values.

As we have noted, the high level of policy interest and ambition for cultural and science diplomacy is not currently matched by the funding to achieve it. In part the result of its limited formal competence, EU’s initiatives must rely on existing institutions and instruments, and relevant member state resources for implementation. EL-CSID research highlights the problem of how to provide sustainability of programming in the context of short-term budgeting. The European Commission and its agencies do manage some funding instruments relatively autonomously, which constitute the core resources of a ‘community’ approach to science and innovation diplomacy and international cultural relations/cultural diplomacy, but the picture varies however, between science and culture.

In science, framework programmes for R&I have been partly tailored towards external objectives and foreign audiences, keeping in mind the need to safeguard the independence of scientific research, especially basic research but also with an eye on the competitiveness of the EU vis-à-vis emerging economies. In culture however, most of the EU-level resources reside in funding instruments for development cooperation, and culture constitutes a relatively minor topic. The challenge resides in creating financial support for a new approach of enhanced cooperation with member states and other stakeholders, pooling resources for common objectives, which has begun to emerge in the case of ICR in countries like Tunisia and Ukraine.

An opportunity exists to agree jurisdiction vis à vis member states in programme coordination and resource allocation to the advantage of the EU scale and reach. This would go some way to addressing maximising impact of funding. In part, the answer may also lie in a further question - how to most effectively engage with non-state actors to maximise the reach and sustainability of programming.

Second, an external, and sometimes internal, perception of the EU as a funding body rather than a genuine partner still exists. Findings across the spectrum of EL-CSID research confirm that the style of engagement and delivery from the EU to its partners is critical to achieving the goals of its science and cultural diplomacy agenda as an integral part of its external relations. Sensitive deployment of initiatives with regard to local cultural norms and values (and needs) requires:

- Grounding all initiatives in local realities;
- Dialogue rather than messaging in all communicative forms (increasingly including digital/social media);
- Genuine engagement as a partner, not a donor.

That EU policy actors may think they are in a post-colonial cultural environment is not to say that the countries with which they interact in the developing world are of the same mind. The EU is not lagging other global actors like the US, China and Japan in this area and also like them neither is the EU consistent in its practices, either in EU programmes or between member states.

Cooperation Versus Competition

An EU approach and practice of ‘open to the world’ in science and innovation diplomacy can also be found to an extent in cultural diplomacy. But it is fighting against strong sentiments of nationalist and a protectionist flavour mindset that has only grown stronger during the life of EL-CSID.

	COOPERATION	COMPETITION
CULTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU International Relations focused on trust and relationship building • Member State s’ bilateral relationships internal/external EU • Problem solving – eg joint programmes for social problems, capacity building. 	EU International relations focused on - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unilateral reputation building • EU’s standing as global influencer • Promoting liberal democratic values versus nationalist autocracy (eg EU v Russia)
SCIENCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sharing EU competence – building neighbourhood capacity • Problem solving – eg joint actions on climate, health etc 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve EU scientific and Industrial leadership • EU’s standing as centre of excellence, eg attract world class science to EU projects

Work Package Findings and Analysis

The Wider Perspective

European cultural and science diplomacy within a wider theoretical, analytical and applied comparative context.

Findings – Culture

A working assumption of the research conducted in the EL-CSID project is that the development of international cultural relations as a component of Europe’s external relations is an appropriate direction to follow. The strategic approach as it has developed since 2014 and seen through the various EU documents (notably 2014, 2016a and b, 2017) is well structured and for the most part sophisticated. Moreover, it has met with a large degree of consensus amongst the principal institutional players across the spectrum of the Brussels policy community—from officials in the Commission and the EEAS and MEPs through to the key quasi-governmental and civil society actors such as EUNIC. The strategy has been positive and mostly restrained in its assertion of Europe’s cultural virtues and their positivity for international relations. However, the manner of the strategies’ rollout leaves certain elements to be desired; notably the unfortunate tendency at times of the High Representative (to the exasperation of some of her own officials even to refer to Europe as a “cultural superpower.” For example, as she did in her remarks at the opening of the Frankfurt Book Fair, 9 October 2018;

Culture is an integral part of our European foreign policy. We are by definition, as Europeans, a soft power. And even now that we are investing more than ever in developing our hard power – that sometimes is needed — our European Defence, our strategic autonomy that sometimes might be needed we continue to be a cultural superpower. Let me say, the cultural superpower in the world.

There has been a failure to appreciate the degree to which a successful strategy to enhance international standing through cultural relations and cultural diplomacy depends on how it is greeted by partners and recipients. Research from EL-CSID, as the work of WP 4 attests, confirms this judgment. As we have also noted, the strategy has been further hampered by an unresolved conceptual ambiguity and lack of definitional precision in the relationship between international cultural relations on the one hand and cultural diplomacy on the other. The demarcation between the two realms of activity has to this date not been satisfactorily determined by those engaged in the development of the strategy.

There is no agreement on what would constitute the core of a narrative on European culture and cultural relations. Brussels has been driving the strategic approach to international cultural relations notwithstanding that the 2007 Lisbon Treaty gives it only a supporting competence to the activities of the member states. This issue of jurisdiction and “competence” also continues to be a concern, with an ambiguous relationship between the various Brussels actors and institutions and practices of the member states reflected through both their formal and quasi-formal representation (reflected in the role of their national institutes of culture). Resource allocation to-date has not followed the ambition of the strategic approach reflected in the Joint Communication.

The evolution of the Brussels-led strategy for the enhancement of the EU’s international cultural relations has been the victim of circumstance - both its own making and beyond its control. Timing has also been unfortunate, one could even say bad luck, coinciding with the sharp rise in populist and nationalist politics in Europe and across the Atlantic and a period of atavistic international relations unprecedented since the height of the Cold War. Deteriorating EU relationships with traditional allies, especially the United States, has had adverse effects in traditionally strong areas of cultural and science relationships such as higher education (see Higgott and Boers, 2019).

Findings – Science

The EL CSID project has identified a number of problems and challenges related to the shaping of science diplomacy in the EU. Despite a proliferation of initiatives, coordinating a policy or strategy for EU science diplomacy initiatives are hampered by an ambiguity in how the concept is used, who the principal actors might be and what counts as science diplomacy in practice. This needs to be settled as otherwise there is a risk that science diplomacy will suffer the same fate as the concepts like “technology assessment”, popular a couple of decades ago and now all but disappeared.

Today we have many different practices that are labelled science diplomacy, such as:

- Soft power to attract scientists and to promote a country
- Exchange programmes to stimulate scientific cooperation
- Science advisors in Foreign Affairs departments
- Science diplomats in embassies or in diplomatic missions
- Scientific contacts in the context of conflict resolution

This diverse set of practices reflects the vague and multi-faceted nature of Science Diplomacy and creates several problems. The first is that the polysemous nature of the concept of Science Diplomacy (which goes back to the triple definition proposed by the AAAS/Royal Society 2010 report) has resulted in very different national and European understandings of and approaches to science diplomacy. This in turn makes it difficult to develop a coherent strategy and to make the concept accepted by scientists. Indeed, while the concept of science diplomacy might have gained some currency amongst the European science policy making community, it is still either unknown or received with some scepticism by the wider scientific community (Proud, 2018). Another major problem is that scientists tend to be sceptical of governments that may want to ‘use’ them in pursuing their agenda. Conversely, foreign governments may react in an equally wary and reluctant manner when cooperation in science is suddenly framed as a foreign policy, or diplomatic, initiative.

On the other side of the spectrum, most member state governments lack a clear strategy regarding science diplomacy. For some, it seems to function as a mere catchword used to label their policy of nation-branding and self-promotion. Currently, supporters and investigators of science diplomacy are mainly located within policy communities. As such, the primary drivers of science diplomacy are

policymakers in states or intergovernmental organizations, calling into question the extent to which scientists are actually involved and actively promote policy agendas.

Thus, rather than simply reiterate the Royal Society/American Association for the Advancement of Science threefold typology of science diplomacy (2010) or even look for a precise definition we are probably better served in 2019 by seeing the concept as a mental and discursive tool to refer to networks of people that engage in practices that have both a scientific and a diplomatic component. Consequently, there exists a realm of activities that can be qualified as science diplomacy whether or not the actors refer actually to their activities and practices as science diplomacy, let alone refer to themselves as science diplomats. This might be considered as the difference between *doing* science diplomacy by professionals who are aware of their diplomatic role e.g. science advisor to foreign affairs departments and *creating* science diplomacy through scientifically focused activities and collaborations that have diplomatic consequences. This includes the formation of international networks and the advice given to foreign affairs departments.

Therefore, science diplomacy can manifest in a number of different ways. It may be a profession; for example, science advisors within Foreign Affairs Departments and scientific attachés at embassies. As a policy and accounting tool to promote certain activities (notwithstanding the conceptual vagueness, it has the advantage of being a label that can be used in budget-lines). It is also a tool to describe the diplomatic outcomes or benefits from what scientists are doing, and in this sense, it can be regarded as a mobilizing concept.

The EI-CSID project has proposed several alternative framings for science diplomacy. In Van Langenhove (2016) it was proposed to focus upon the global dimension of Science Diplomacy. The *Tools for an EU Science Diplomacy Report (2017)* introduced three potential focus areas that are a mix of self-interest and aspiration for a positive impact on the world. These are:

- (i) Science and Technology contributions towards enhancing regional security in a country's neighbourhood,
- (ii) Science and technology contributions towards improving trade in the world, and
- (iii) Science and Technology contributions towards tackling global problems.

There are very different understandings of and approaches to science diplomacy at both EU and national levels where at both levels its identification remains a problem especially given that the concept of science diplomacy remains largely an unknown concept or one subject to considerable scepticism within the wider scientific community. Furthermore, in most cases the development of a science diplomacy policy is usually undertaken with little input from, or coordination, with the relevant national departments of foreign affairs, international trade or development aid. In a surprising contrast to the strategy developed by the High Representative HE Federica Mogherini and the EEAS in the domain of cultural diplomacy the EU has yet to develop and deploy a coherent strategy for science diplomacy.

This lacuna is all the more important contemporaneously given the challenges to global scientific knowledge emanating from populist nationalist antipathy to science (Nicholls, 2017) and the accompanying strains on international scientific cooperation emanating from this hostility. Some governments actively present 'alternative facts' to counter 'scientific facts' or limit access to scientific data that do not support governmental preferences. Populism and nationalism are often accompanied by protectionism, which stands in opposition to the ideals of the scientific community. The risk of protectionism for science is that governments will increasingly attempt to keep scientific findings within their domestic boundaries. In undermining the "open to the world" vision of science, such developments endanger not only the endeavour of scientific inquiry, but also the implementation of science diplomacy.

Moreover, certain governments adopt policy positions that inhibit scientists providing advice to relevant bodies and departments, and thus become involved in evidence-based policy-making. In the United States, science in diplomacy is exemplified by the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), originally created by President Roosevelt in 1933 as the Science Advisory Board. Yet in the Trump administration, the PCAST has neither held any formal meetings nor published any official documents. The inactivity of the PCAST demonstrates the reduced level of priority given to scientific concerns and phenomena, including climate change, by the current administration.

Analysis & Recommendations

It has always proved difficult to see ICR and cultural diplomacy as activities and practices in their own right, rather than as second tier instruments in some wider, ill-defined notion of a country's soft power. In an international environment characterised by a struggle to establish the contours of a "post liberal"

international order, soft power diplomacy will battle for both oxygen and resources against the harder material politico-strategic and economic approaches to diplomacy. In this context, cultural and science diplomacy will become more, not less, important as Europe must have a say in the global conversation about the contours of any new order. Accordingly, a series of recommendations in the area of culture are in order –

The European policy community engaged in international cultural relations should resist attempts to define a European narrative common to all member states and a formal definition of cultural diplomacy. Rather than search for set definitions for actors in cultural engagement—official (EEAS), quasi-official (EUNIC) and non-official civil society actors (in the arts and cultural communities)—the Commission should develop strategies to map the evolving activity across the spectrum from international cultural relations through to state driven cultural diplomacy, making it clear where the line is crossed. It is not sufficient for advocates of international cultural relations simply to say it is not cultural diplomacy. They need to demonstrate why it is not and when in fact their activity becomes diplomacy.

In the domain of institutional diplomacy, Brussels based practitioners should accept their secondary supportive role to the primacy of member state interests and policy. But policymakers should nevertheless revisit the issue of “core competence” and, at a minimum, identify mechanisms for joining up EEAS and Commission policy with member state policy.

If the Commission is serious about the strategy it should identify and provide earmarked funding to support a strategic approach to the enhancement of European international cultural relations. At the time of writing this report this has not happened, with few exceptions, although the prospects of earmarked funding is at least on the horizon for 2019.

Brussels agencies should develop a joined-up structure of governance for ICR and cultural diplomacy. Recognising the ambiguous nature of the relationship between state and non-state actors in ICR, the principle stakeholders need to be identified and the structures of governance need to be worked out in some detail. Again, serious activity to bring this about is under development. Several elements of this thinking process are important:

- The role of the Friends of the Presidency Group (on a strategic approach to international cultural relations) has been wound up after its role in defining the initial roadmap. Its role will be replaced by the Cultural Affairs Committee.
- The role of the EEAS needs to be fully articulated and explained for the clarity of stakeholders in the arts and cultural communities.
- While EUNIC is the main actor facilitating the enhanced cooperation approach on ICR—with an administrative relationship with the EEAS—it is still necessary to articulate a more precise role for this important non-state network as an interlocutor in the relationship between the policy community and wider civil society.
- Similarly, consideration should be given to the future role of *Creative Europe* and *More Europe* and other networks and programmes now that the new strategy has been adopted.

Training in the provision of international and cultural diplomacy needs to be upgraded: Serious and systematic thought about the nature of training that is offered in cultural diplomacy is required. Instruction cannot, as many from the cultural sector seem to think, be developed and taught in isolation of the wider considerations of overall EU external relations and strategy more generally. It would make sense to engage Europe’s universities international relations community in this process. One positive output from EL-CSID is the move towards the development in 2019 of a new Brussels School of European Studies and Global Governance at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) that could be the home of an envisaged Centre for Diplomacy.

In determining specific recommendations for science diplomacy, EI-CSID has critically assessed the status of science diplomacy in the EU and the rest of the world, considering how best to mobilise science to enhancing EU external relations. As one of the biggest research funders in the world, with the ambition to be a global and regional actor, the EU is intrinsically invested in science as a tool of international influence and soft power. This also comes with a moral responsibility to defend the values of science and freedom of scientific cooperation at a global level, part of its agenda for ‘open science’. From a practical perspective, given the scattered science policy landscape in Europe, it makes sense to support member states in developing their capacity in science diplomacy.

There is potential for the EU to further integrate science diplomacy in its open science agenda, with focus on four priorities:

- (i) Reinforcing for the use of S&T cooperation as an instrument for internal cohesion.
- (ii) Strategically deploying S&T cooperation as an instrument in the enhancement of neighbourhood policy of the EU. (In this context the relationship between science and cultural diplomacy as a peace building instrument becomes germane). The interaction between national scientists is or should be an important element of the EU's approach towards enhancing international cultural relations across policy areas, including science).
- (iii) Promoting and supporting an open S&T worldwide by freeing access of public funded results and by promoting the value of free speech for scientists
- (iv) Enhancing the EU's ability to be a leader in mobilizing science for the SDG agenda of the United Nations.

Given the current geopolitical situation and the enduring global problems the world is facing, a possible strategy for an EU science diplomacy could be a triple focus:

- (i) EU science diplomacy as tool for EU trade expansion.
- (ii) EU science diplomacy as a tool for increasing regional security in the EU's neighbourhood.
- (iii) EU science diplomacy as a tool for realizing the sustainable development goals.

To realize these priorities the EU should invest in awareness and capacity building activities towards science diplomacy. As a first step, a 'preparatory action' such as the one implemented for the EU's cultural diplomacy, should be launched for science diplomacy. Part of this preparatory action could be the creation of an EU platform or observatory for science diplomacy that serves as a knowledge sharing platform. The prime objective for developing an EU science diplomacy strategy should also be that it becomes a fully-fledged part of the wider EU strategy for external actions. Today, science diplomacy is mentioned as one of the policy domains of the EEAS, but it is not central to its strategy. Moreover, the efforts of DG Research in science diplomacy are not well integrated with the EEAS strategy

Specifically, in the context of enhancing future framework programmes, recommendations for Horizon Europe include:

- o Building a science diplomacy element into the mission approach of Horizon Europe
- o Developing a joint strategy of EEAS and DG RTD toward science and technology relations with neighbourhood countries
- o Developing awareness and capacity building in science diplomacy for scientists, policymakers and diplomats while recognising that such a suggestion is not entirely unproblematic.

Finally, a series of general recommendations can be made:

Future Directions for Science Diplomacy				
Scholars	Policymakers	Scientists	Practitioners	Communications
Development of theory that appropriately links the practice of science diplomacy to actions in innovation, research and technology, including case studies demonstrating the success (and failures) of science diplomacy.	Integrate aspirations for science as a diplomatic tool into relevant policy and strategy. Increase monitoring of developments in science diplomacy.	Find mechanisms to build awareness of the foreign policy implications of scientific studies and collaborations, including the use of peer networks.	Increase exchange of best practice between practitioners, and communication with policymakers and scientists.	Care should be taken when using the term "diplomacy" in order not to offend the sensitivities of scientists who do not necessarily see themselves engaged in diplomacy.

Applied Policy Analysis – Science and Innovation Diplomacy

EL-CSID considered and engaged in an exercise in applied policy analysis that looked at sovereign priorities in Europe-wide science and innovation policy for different states, public bodies and transnational actors. The two key objectives were:

- (i) To track new developments in the field of science diplomacy, assess the different means and ends of the concept and explore emerging opportunities for its use.

- (ii) To consider innovation's relationship to science diplomacy and its future directions; taking into account the growing importance of knowledge and innovation in modern economies and societies.

Findings

Our research identified an emerging trend to stress national interests, symbolized most dramatically in the discourse and practice of 'America First' policies putting pressure on science diplomacy as a global, multilateral, collaborative endeavour. There is also an increasing need to defend the authority and values of both scientific knowledge and academic freedom. Such pressures notwithstanding, evidence suggests that science and scientists continue to globalise their networks and activities, creating additional links and interdependencies between countries and across continents.

In the new realities of international relations identified at the beginning of this report, three forces—in some ways seemingly contradictory—are likely to be present and interact in the domains of science and innovation:

- (i) A continuation of the strong internationalisation trends of the recent past in which innovation and growth are regarded as being beneficial for all. Here, innovation in science and technology is seen as global public good.
- (ii) Strong societal and technological tendencies are producing networking externalities and the push for globalisation inherent to many of the new technologies of today and the foreseeable future. An appreciation of the consequences of user driven "bottom-up" innovations in sustainability development, urban development, employment and other fields whose consequences are still largely beyond the scope and comprehension of official politics, although oftentimes they are supported, and fuelled, by innovation policies.
- (iii) At the same time as trends one and two are developing we are also seeing the rise of "indigenous innovation first". Defensive or protective policies like raising import tariffs on certain strategic products, limiting scientific or technological collaboration, preventing the take-over of national "icon-companies" by foreign investors, requiring local content to secure access to markets, and similar policies are flourishing.

The third trend is at the core of the progressively deteriorating relationship between the United States and China as the USA struggles to retain, and in some instances, recapture lost technological pre-eminence, while China attempts to hang on to the gains it has made in recent decades in its scientific and technological competitiveness. In the growing nationalist standoff between the erstwhile hegemon and the rising great power that is China, thoughts of cooperation in science diplomacy have given way to aggressive competition (see Higgott, 2019).

The term science diplomacy has spread across a great many fields and subjects, ranging from the more traditional area of international S&T policy-making to the domains of development cooperation or the global discourses on sustainability and climate diplomacy. In contrast to this seemingly growing interest in the topic, however, we did not find many innovations as to both programmes and instruments for meeting science diplomacy objectives. Most member states continue to rely on established tools in their external S&T and foreign policy; S&T Agreements, customised funding programmes and Science Counsellor networks. There is no one size fits all approach and not even a widely shared commonly understanding of science diplomacy's meaning or uses.

The EU and member states deploy all these conventional instruments of science diplomacy, but this appears not to have had a positive bearing on the inter-play between the trans and supranational and national levels. Rather, efforts not to interfere in this domestic international relationship in the face of intensifying competition in global science and innovation seems to be the order of the day.

Member states are not ready, or willing, to transfer wide-ranging competencies in S&T policy or foreign affairs to the European Commission unless there is an urgent need to do so or an obvious advantage. Other than at the already existing programme level (e.g. Horizon 2020), they are very suspicious when it comes to any claims for enhanced science diplomacy from the Commission. Hence, an EC focus on areas that are undeniably within its jurisdiction or that may carry positive returns for all member states at the same time. It could and should seize a role that is largely different from mimicking national science diplomacy and explore and push forward with areas of common (regional and global) interest. For example:

- The promotion of common scientific values and global research governance.
- Leveraging the European Research Area (ERA), the European Research Council (ERC), or the Framework Programmes that can serve as a global brand for good governance of science.

- The EU as a self-proclaimed “normative” strength is well-suited to the defence of academic norms and values such as objectivity, transparency, freedom of thought and speech.
- The demonstration and consolidation of the values of collaboration and integration.
- Sharing the operational systems, mechanisms and procedures of implementing these innovative structures.

These EU values and practices could and should buttress international activities concerned with the global dissemination and maintenance of common standards for the responsible conduct of research and the fight against unwarranted political interference. However, the question as to whether the EU is able to meet these expectations. Its inability to defend the Central European University from the Hungarian FIDESZ government would be a case in point that challenges this idealized strategy.

Moreover, as we have noted in the era of heightened nationalism science has become an issue in the competitive relations between nations. This raises the question whether there is still room for a view of science as a relatively neutral and authoritative function in society and if there is a special role for scientists in international relations?

A further question we considered was whether we should distinguish between science diplomacy and innovation diplomacy. In the case of innovation diplomacy, activity can push science, technology and innovation forward – in the national interest or (if we see innovation as global public good) in the international or global interest. It is “diplomacy for science (and innovation)” in the terminology of the Royal Society and the AAAS. But what can science do for diplomacy? Responsible science and responsible scientists contributing joint scientific insights and joint views on policy actions should be welcomed, especially when the current political environment is less receptive to experts, not to mention facts. The world of science should, wherever possible, take collaborative action to build such insights and policy views on the many issues which transcend national boundaries. Cooperation in science can also build confidence between scientists, institutions and to a further extent, countries. Science diplomacy and innovation diplomacy are therefore not so far apart, since they can be used either for national or global purposes and differ primarily in terms of instrumentation and the involved actors.

Analysis & Recommendations

The Commission should seek dialogue with the member states to identify areas in which a common position and joint science diplomacy activities could be beneficial to all parties. The Strategic Forum for International S&T Cooperation (SFIC) already provides one platform for the exchange of opinions and for planning joint activities vis-à-vis emerging science powers like China. In view of the size and power of China in particular, a joint approach giving smaller member states the same access to scientific resources and research opportunities as the larger members of the EU would appear to make sense. In this context, four starting points, or policy directions, should guide diplomatic efforts and the development of European innovation diplomacy:

1. Continue to foster, maintain and spread the message of open science, open innovation and remain open to the world. It clearly outlines the intentions and directions of the EU when it enters the international or global arena: open collaboration to the benefit of all participants, taking international solidarity and the perspective of innovation as a global public good as its starting point. This starting point needs to be complemented with at least three other policy initiatives.
2. Increase efforts to create a global level playing field including free trade, free exchange of knowledge and of innovative products and services. This requires appropriate reciprocity in exchanging information, technology and innovations. There may be good reasons to transfer technology under favourable conditions to developing and/or partner countries, but the potential consequences in the EU market may justify regulation of such transfers and the setting of limits to the freedom of companies to freely move their (technology) assets to other countries. In the same vein, the development and implementation of Europe’s “Open Science Cloud” (facilitating the exchange of data and research tools) must include a number of measures, which regulate collaboration with global partners (Science/Business Network, 2018)
3. Identify and increase awareness of the EU’s technological and related business strengths and in how far such strengths are critical for the functioning of Europe’s economy and society. Europe represents a large and wealthy market, has a strong and innovative industry, which delivers high quality products and services, and it has several strong innovation eco-systems.

Fostering such strengths and critical technologies is necessary to maintain a strong negotiating position in a world in which a major player like the US is moving toward a transactional approach to international relations. The actual policies may be both defensive as well as offensive. The intention of this third policy approach is to add a position of power to Europe's international relations and negotiations in the field of innovation.

4. Finally, the EU should focus on identifying and spreading key social values and goals (e.g. quality of life, quality of labour, culture, privacy and sustainability) in its internal and external innovation policies. Such values and goals can partly be spread to other countries via collaborative activities such as in the case of the transfer of European thinking about innovation eco-systems and the related smart specialisation strategies (Sanchez, Arrizabalaga, & Mendibil, 2018). International collaboration might also be the preferred mechanism to regulate the social impacts of the platform economy business and other oligopolistic sectors, but one-sided action could be just as effective, as shown by the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation). In the case of GDPR the EU's example sets a standard, which finds many global followers. There are also cases where some form of force has been used, such as when Bangladesh was exempted from preferential trade arrangements with the US and Europe, to force the country to rapidly modernise the labour conditions in its textile industries. Societal goals driving future EU research and innovation missions will, together with the UN SDGs, will be good starting points to invite other countries to join these missions and pursue similar goals.

It is important to bring these policy directions together in a coherent framework, to present a clear future oriented vision for the EU's role in international science and innovation. With such a vision, and supporting policies, the role of the EU on the global stage increases in visibility and strength. The Commission, in other words, should seize a role that is largely different from merely mimicking national approaches to science diplomacy and explore and push forward with areas of common (regional and global) interest. By increasing the visibility of its science diplomacy and by joining forces with the member states whenever this seems feasible and necessary, the EU could leave a lasting mark on the future of the field.

Transnational and Collaborative Dynamics

EL-CSID's work here covered a range of transnational and collaborative dynamics; notably in the domains of global health diplomacy, in the context of combatting pandemics, nation branding, digital diplomacy in Central Asia, leveraging European diaspora communities, and global policy partnerships of international organisations and governments with other transnational actors in diplomacy. Given this diversity of domains each is considered individually below.

Culture and Science in Combating Pandemics

This portion of Work Package 3 set out to trace knowledge exchange on HIV between EU and (South and West) Africa. Embedded in theories and tools of political science, and enriched by anthropological insights, the work proceeded amidst a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. While traditional North Atlantic, state-centric bilateral and multilateral ties frayed, sub-Saharan Africa moved towards further integration. Applied in the realm of health diplomacy these help elucidate the space where and shed light on how knowledge exchange on health between the EU and (South and West) Africa can take place. Critical findings pertain to (missed) opportunities and challenges for integration of medical / health science with (local) culture and (political governance) diplomacy for responding to pandemics and treatment / prevention of infectious diseases in sub-Saharan Africa.

- There is no agreed-upon definition of health diplomacy or of health security. It is not clear for by whom, health diplomacy can and should be carried out, or for whose health security. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity.
- Capacity to respond is often stretched beyond its limits.
- Regional approaches being tested in Sub-Saharan Africa should be analyzed for their applicability in the European context; they offer initial solutions to addressing health security for citizens and non-citizen populations, the latter of which are growing around the globe.

Key findings / Identified gaps with regard to HIV response in South Africa:

- The role of South Africa as a niche diplomat on health is no longer a given.
- Despite the strides in epidemic response across sectors, a consensus is emerging in South Africa that “never again” will the private sector join forces with the state to mount a health response in the way that this happened to tackle HIV and AIDS. This has implications for private-public partnerships, and cross-sector knowledge exchange.
- Rates of (multi-drug resistant and extremely drug resistant) tuberculosis, its co-infection with HIV, and antibiotic drug resistance writ large are rapidly rising. There is a gap between state, bilateral and multilateral approaches and regional approaches.

Key findings / Identified gaps with regard to Ebola response in West Africa:

- Lack of appropriate global and regional governance structures limits the possibility for incorporating vital local cultural and social dimensions of health and human development in the response to epidemics and health challenges by global institutions (e.g. WHO) and the international donor community, with dire consequences.
- Effective global health diplomacy in relation to epidemic response will involve juggling the art of diplomacy with the science of public policy and concrete national interests, balanced with the abstract collective concern of the larger international community faced with a rapidly changing global order.
- Lessons for future pandemics: Better preparedness (surveillance, funds, policy) to ensure that the response at national and international levels to future outbreaks is grounded on local social and cultural realities, better communication with global health community and shared responsibility.

Analysis & Recommendations

Better preparedness (surveillance, funds, policy) is required to ensure that the response at national and international levels to future outbreaks is grounded on local social and cultural realities, better communication within the global health community and shared responsibility.

Producing strong, resilient and equitable global health architecture (based on innovative reforms in global health governance), and strengthening of health systems in developing countries, would enhance health security at all levels and enable people (e.g. in Africa) to live healthier lives.

Nation and Region Branding as a Form of Public and Cultural Diplomacy

Findings

Nation branding has moved from a focus on ‘country of origin’, to ‘place branding’, to ‘corporate branding’ and is now increasingly taking the form of ‘policy branding’. However, this shift towards policy branding also seems to be accompanied (and maybe even led) by increasing reliance on benchmarking practices as both a means to diagnose the standing of particular nation brands, but also as a form of nation branding in and of itself.

Examination of benchmarking practices, however, suggests that they tend to oversimplify relative national performance that reduces their effectiveness in policy making. And while they may be useful for branding the top-ranking countries, they are of little value to low ranking countries as a guide to policy solutions or governance strategies to address the challenges identified.

Two specific cases of national branding were considered:

(i) Brand Africa

This strategy presumed that the best way to counter negative images of Africa was with more positive stories of the continent. In practice Brand Africa offered up a very different geopolitical vision of a possible and desirable African future, however the analysis also unpicked the extent to which the initiative was and is actually embedded within a particular (South African) national context and its ambition to depoliticise/detoxify its own national branding, while simultaneously seeking to reinstate its role as a regional leader.

The dominance of South Africa in the development of the Brand Africa project remains a good example of how supranational branding can be co-opted by particular interests and how corporate interests have

come to trump those of other communities who may have other ideas about African political, social, cultural and economic development. The result has been arguably dysfunctional. What this has highlighted is that the emancipatory potential and assumed synergies between national and supranational branding in a government's diplomacy are not as obvious as they may at first sight seem. Continental branding and public diplomacy may not always be equally attractive and beneficial to all states in specific regional contexts.

(ii) The Nordic Region

Nordic 'peace' has become central to national and regional branding messages and seems to endure, both within the region but also abroad despite the existence of significant policies and practices that should at face value challenge its diplomatic claims to be a major peacemaker. Internally 'being good' has become an idealized—even fantasised—Identity that appeals because it offers a sense of self-esteem, status, ontological security and agency in the world; what Lawler and others have characterised as the good state or the good international citizen (Lawler, 2005.) Insofar as it has become idealised then mechanisms have emerged that serve to uphold the ideal even in situations where the region has fallen short of its aspirations. Externally, the idea seems to hold because various Nordic 'myths' often hold a utility that can to a degree be mobilised in the domestic politics of other nations as a means for legitimising, or indeed delegitimising different policy options.

Analysis & Recommendations

In a world in which a sense of competitive identity is seen to matter, paying attention to and possibly trying to cultivate a brand (or brands) needs consideration. Branding, however, is a constitutive exercise and is therefore inherently political and unstable. Attention should always be paid to which visions and whose interests are prioritised, and whose are marginalised. Nation and region branding can backfire or, as is more usual, fail to make any impact at all.

Tempting though it is, region (and nation) branding is not a panacea for more engrained structural, economic or political problems. In particular, the relationship between region/nation branding and region/nation building is complex and it is not self-evident that the former leads to the latter. It is not a quick fix for either identity construction or legitimacy generation. But it is not without important messages for the student and practitioner of EU cultural diplomacy. The recent shift towards 'policy branding' in discrete areas might provide the EU with a good way of rejuvenating an international reputation as an exemplar and model.

Cultural Diplomatic Modus Operandi : A Central Asian Case Study

The research team based at Nazarbayev University investigated:

- How and to what extent the elements of the EU's image produced by media discourse, shapes the national identity of Kazakhstan;
- The social media employed by the European embassies to engage indirectly with local populations;
- The role of health and scientific engagement for diplomatic purposes; and
- The role of mega-events for EU diplomatic engagement in the context of the Astana Expo in 2018.

Findings

The initial focus of the EU's engagement with Central Asia was on promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights. From 2007, however, it broadened scope and included cooperation in culture, science and health. The intensified engagement has been more visible and better received than projects on democratisation that are seen 'as long-term and often ineffective'. The most effective initiatives have been those seen to respond to the needs of the Central Asian states (in cases of health and science cooperation as well as engagement with diaspora) without overtly challenging the established order.

There is still more public awareness (news coverage) on bilateral relations with EU member states than between Kazakhstan and the EU as a single political entity, although the EU is positively received as an important, trustworthy and strategic economic partner. EU ties are of great symbolic importance as they promote values and standards that Kazakhstan strongly wants to project as its own. By openly subscribing to such ideals, the political elite bolsters both its legitimacy and its ambition for an active global role.

Local dialogue is not conditioned by inherent distrust or hostility. A secular population and the absence of history of European imperialism mitigates any such problems often experienced in former colonial countries. In embassy communication, a more personal touch, engagement in local languages, as well as personal and diverse content, often promote understanding, gain sympathy and increase visibility. Mega-events present significant opportunities for scientific, innovation and cultural diplomacy. EU coordination in the particular case of Astana Expo 2017 was weak and it appeared underprepared. As a result, member states' pavilions competed for attention. Europe *per se* was invisible.

Analysis & Recommendations

Our research on Kazakhstan demonstrated that if diplomacy is sensitively deployed with regard to the needs of the community, it can have considerable potential. One particular lesson is that better digital *engagement* rather than mere *messaging* may strengthen Europe's cultural, science and innovation diplomacy. Social media use is too often characterised by uni-directional monologue despite examples of the best practices.

Similarly, at international events, European exhibits should be sited close to each other, the messages provided should be coordinated and the common EU positions and policies should be identified.

Leveraging The Diaspora In Cultural Diplomacy

Findings

The European diaspora is underutilised in cultural and science diplomacy. These groups can include professional networks and NGOs with extensive reach and capability in partner countries

In Central Asia, the European diaspora communities (Bulgarian, Estonian, Finn, German, Greek, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish and Romanian) were created as a result of political and economic forces in the 19th and 20th centuries. Current members of the communities are longstanding citizens of Kazakhstan. The research showed that they still value the link to their original homeland. While their cultural activities are supported by the Kazakh government, they are nevertheless undervalued as an instrument to leverage European cultural diplomacy. Some member states do engage purposefully with the diaspora, but others tend to miss the opportunity for meaningful exchange.

For small to middle sized member states of the European Union, the Australian experience with regard to the public diplomacy of diaspora organization – Advance – offers a few lessons. For a country of its population, size and wealth, Australia has relatively few diplomatic missions. Nor does it have an equivalent agency such as the British Council or Goethe Institute. Instead, with limited public and financial resources, the Australian government (as well as state governments) have operated both innovatively and opportunistically in partnership with non-state actors and on the back of non-state initiatives. But working with well-connected diaspora organisations of Australia's most influential citizens abroad has enabled Australian diplomatic posts to "do more with less" in communicating Australian values and attractiveness (for a detailed discussion, see Stone and Douglas, 2018). This is an approach that can be replicated by EU member states. The value of diaspora in show-casing successful professionals overseas through elevated network interaction is hard to replace through other means of communication, and in the case of Advance, had significant positive externalities for Australian start-ups and for Australia's education system.

Analysis and Recommendations

Diaspora populations and organisations do offer an opportunity to extend and supplement European cultural diplomacy by member states. Rather than consulates acting simply as bodies for managing extra-territorial populations, by providing seed-funding to selected, senior and capable volunteer committees with an appropriate level of administrative support and facilitation, Consulates General have the potential to crowd-source creative events and engagement activities led by an organised diaspora community.

Advance was built on the premise of a networked global economy and its organisational structure is to operate as, and to gestate, (professional) networks. Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) cannot operate in this fashion, but they can sponsor and otherwise patronise those types of network organisations that can.

Finally, diplomacy via diaspora bodies such as Advance did not, and do not, function with specific strategies of cultural diplomacy or science diplomacy in mind. Instead, science and cultural diplomacy have been mixed in with, or blended with, other forms of economic, food, sport, or water diplomacy.

Transnational Networks and Global Partnerships

EL-CSID investigated how new architectures of governance –created to ameliorate transnational policy problems—not only presaged the emergence of new spheres of public action, including diplomacy, but also provide opportunity for both new diplomatic actors and diplomatic innovation. Accordingly, the project departed from the narrow understanding of diplomacy as an official inter-governmental process to capture three other sets of actors and institutions in science diplomacy:

- (i) International civil servants in organisations like the World Bank, United Nations agencies;
- (ii) National public servants and government officers in health, telecommunications, transport, energy, law and justice who create trans-governmental policy networks (TGNs) with their foreign government counterparts; and
- (iii) Some non-state actors who became science diplomats through their professional activities and the internationalisation of scientific associations.

Findings

Global governance innovations are varied and include:

- (i) Informal international organisations and ‘clubs’ (such as the BRICS and G20);
- (ii) Global public private partnerships such as GAVI or the ASEAN Regional Knowledge Network on Forests and Climate Change;
- (iii) A diverse range of policy networks and associations that vary in their degree of institutionalization, size, legal stature and depth of involvement with formal decision-making authorities.

Due to technological and scientific advances, most fields of governance have become highly complex requiring regular input and monitoring by highly trained professionals and scientific advisors. Reliance on expert consultation, evidence construction and technocratic deliberation in global and regional governance creates new cadres of transnational administrators, and institutes ‘knowledge’ organisations and networks as governance institutions (see Stone and Moloney, 2019).

Central to expert power in global governance are knowledge networks (KNETs). Knowledge can have an independent force in policy-making; not only do global KNETs create and transfer knowledge that is both ‘scientific’ and policy relevant, they are the necessary hardware, personnel and finances to support knowledge acquisition and policy implementation. As instruments of global governance, KNETs incorporate professional bodies, academic research groups and scientific communities and are essential for the international spread of research results, scientific practice and what is deemed international ‘best practice’ on matters such as banking standards, immunisation schemes, sustainable fisheries or corporate social responsibility.

The new global governance innovations tend to deploy tactics of ‘de-politicisation’ to legitimate their public actions and policy initiatives through the “scientisation” of their work. That is, they seek to enhance their own power through epistemic authority.

But institutions and networks are reluctant to refer to what they do as ‘science diplomacy’. Instead, the language of ‘evidence-based policy making’ or ‘bridging research and policy’ or supporting ‘global public goods’ provision is preferred (See Stone and Maxwell, 2006).

National governments are responding slowly to these global dynamics. Policy officials based outside Ministries of Foreign Affairs are not necessarily adequately equipped to engage effectively with transnational policy communities. The realities of transnational administration necessitate new skills and capacities among public servants with implications for recruitment and training.

Analysis & Recommendations

Policy officials (outside Ministries of Foreign Affairs) are not necessarily equipped to effectively engage with transnational policy communities. Training, resourcing and new practices in specific policy sectors suggest that some reform and resourcing is needed to build the transnational capacities of officials in government agencies who work regularly with their counterparts in foreign government agencies or in international organisations and global public private partnerships.

Inter alia, senior managers may need to see their workforce develop skills beyond simple technical proficiency in the substantive policy area. Greater abilities in the following areas are required:

- Network management and inter-cultural understanding;
- Heightened bureaucratic competence in order to access and navigate the bureaucracies of international organisations, global partnerships and international funding regimes;

- Increased knowledge of international bench-marking, ‘soft law’ and ‘global administrative law’.

Mainstreaming science diplomacy across government departments entails new roles for front line bureaucratic agents engaged in areas including global energy policy, global health policy, global food policy. Front-line agents should also be co-opted and contracted from universities and scientific institutes. But it is not axiomatic that civil servants and/or individual researchers based in universities will have either innate diplomatic skills or a keen knowledge of global policy processes.

The implications for the future are that civil service recruitment and training is likely to be transformed by the dynamics of transnational administration. Likewise, universities will increasingly look to recruit and train their own science diplomats. The Commission should, and the universities can, play a role in this kind of civil service ‘preparedness’ through new training initiatives and tailored post-graduate education of the kind developed at Warwick University and VUB on the back of EL-CSID activity and support¹.

External Perspectives of the EU: Cultural and Science Diplomacy

EL-CSID research has considered EU initiatives in cultural and science diplomacy from the outside looking in, asking what partners think of EU activities in these areas. It was important for this investigation to recognise that in former colonies, notably those of the UK, France and Belgium, a legacy of mistrust towards the EU can still be found. Special attention has been paid to the examination of how cultural and science diplomacy must operate if it is to bridge, rather than exacerbate gaps, in inter-cultural relations.

Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey were the key targets for empirical observation in the EL-CSID research. They provided very different comparative research contexts in which to undertake our analysis.

- In Tunisia, strong development of NGOs and a growing role for associations in the development of the civil society existed alongside more institutionalized forms of cooperation, foremost in universities.
- In Egypt we observed a hierarchical approach, operating increasingly under growing governmental control and reflecting a cautious attitude to the discussion of EU-Egypt cooperation.
- In Turkey, the July 2016 coup attempt negatively impacted relations between Turkey and the EU. The debate over restoring the death penalty in Turkey was seen as ‘deeply worrying’ by European observers. Citing Turkey’s movement away from core EU values, the EU suspended accession negotiations and, at the time of completion of this report, tensions between the EU and Turkey remain high.

Findings

(i) Tunisia and Egypt

Studies showed that mobility and funding were the most cited motivations for taking part in European programmes and mobility opportunities were praised by both the general public and the community of experts. The demand for European language skills was also high. Other programmes however—especially those perceived to support the empowerment of women—were greeted differently by different communities. European values conveyed by the protocols and guidelines of programmes could also be greeted coolly.

There is general confusion of the differences between bilateral and multilateral cooperation in these countries. For most respondents, in both Egypt and Tunisia, “Europe” means the EU as a whole, but also major states such as France, Germany, Italy, the UK or Sweden taken individually. In many cases, a single European country could be viewed as representing the whole EU.

A need to communicate about European programmes to narrow the gap between communities of experts and perceptions held by the general public is required. Strategic communication and social

¹ Professor Stone will introduce in 2019 an MA Course entitled “The New Diplomacy and Public Service”. It has a substantial Science Diplomacy component in it. At VUB, EL-CSID researchers Professors Richard Higgott and Joachim Koops have introduced a new MA in Diplomacy and Global Governance, again with substantial components on science and cultural diplomacy.

media campaigns are important but not sufficient, since they are often viewed with suspicion. Universities and academics are viewed as more trustworthy sources than officials and should be more engaged in communicating cultural and scientific diplomatic efforts.

Local expectations are for concrete deliverables from EU projects and generally it is believed that the EU's influence can stretch very far indeed. It would be wise for the EU to delineate its responsibilities vis-à-vis third countries by a clear communication strategy.

(ii) Turkey

At a generic level, EL-CSID's researchers have regularly discovered the degree to which culture is a topic which, if not treated sensitively, can create feelings of hostility if deeply held cultural and religious sensitivities, beliefs and tradition are offended. The approach of some European cultural institutions has often been to impose a cultural point of view without acknowledging the sensibilities of a local culture. Rather than creating a reciprocal cultural exchange, institutions have focused their actions on the transmission of their own truth, without trying to understand and establish a common ground with the local culture. This stance is perceived by local cultures as an act of imposition and post-colonial imperialist ambition. This characteristic can be found in elements of the EU - Turkey relationship. On the other hand, EU funding programmes such as Erasmus, Horizon 2020, Leonardo and twinning projects are highly appreciated and are perceived as an important support for the socio-economic transformation of society.

While globalisation increases cross-cultural exchanges with a strategic dimension, the 'competition of cultures' is more focused on the market share of ideas and values. Seen for example through a Turkish lens, each European country has its own cultural diplomacy strategy comprised of self-interested foreign policy approaches, sometimes in opposition to the fundamental values of the European Union. The lack of consensus and critical political decisions of some member-states, e.g. the European migrant crisis, damages the image of Europe abroad.

From an external point of view, the main problem facing the EU's cultural diplomacy is lack of coordinated strategy: who does what? Who centralizes and dispatches the responsibilities of each cultural institute? Institutions set up similar cultural projects, so if an external partner wants to set up an intercultural European project or cultural cooperation project, which institution should it contact? Who measures the effectiveness of the projects carried out by these institutions and whether they are consistent with the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policies) strategies?

EU Delegations in respective countries, in this case study Turkey, are of course important but they are largely only symbolically representative. Establishing strategies and policies will never be effective without proper implementation. Field research in Turkey demonstrated that the local population affected by cooperation policies are not always completely informed of current European projects. Interested persons face administrative barriers and a complex application procedure. The Delegation needs to be much more active in the assistance local authorities in the communication and implementation of ongoing cooperation projects.

Recommendations

Recommendations for cultural (and indeed science) diplomacy in neighbourhood regions relate to issues of communication and engagement:

- Ensure sensitivity to local cultures and communicate clearly the objective of funding projects, to avoid the impression of a hidden agenda of either an ideological or economic nature.
- Communicate the opportunities to a wide variety of stakeholders to avoid the perception that international cooperation benefits only a narrow circle of usual beneficiaries. Information should reach the different regions of the partner countries equally, and not only the capital cities.
- Encourage co-ownership and cooperation with Southern partners from early stages, including in the choice of topics and the fields of research selected. This approach would contrast the oft given impression that partners are simply being assigned to a task that has already been planned beforehand by the EU team.

In relation to media relations it is better to engage more foreign (often non-specialist) correspondents in cultural and science diplomacy efforts, especially in areas and with countries where other means of diplomatic efforts have been stalling (e.g. currently with Russia). Culture and science stories might be the only 'positive' news in the international news reporting of those countries in Europe and vice versa. Place particular emphasis to contacts with freelance foreign correspondents and those working for

multiple media outlets that might have been ignored until now, compared to traditional mainstream big media organisations.

In the areas of programme development, coordination and implementation our researchers on Turkey concluded that the EU should consider the following recommendations:

- Highlight the common culture and heritage of (EU and non-EU) Mediterranean states to highlight the shared identity of the region.
- Encourage North-South mobility as a good way of avoiding the “brain drain” effect that some fear in Egypt and Tunisia.
- Develop tailored cultural exchange projects not as cultural imposition, but as a cultural dialogue.
- Transform EU Delegation from its passive status to a dynamic representation that assists local authorities in the communication and implementation of ongoing cooperation projects.
- Create a centralized institution to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s cultural actions. A new governance process should supervise and coordinate the roles, distribution of responsibilities, cooperation, actions and promotion of European policies among the various stakeholders, including EUNIC, More Europe, CDP and the EEAS.
- Reinforce domestic public diplomacy for the integration of Muslim minorities in Europe through cultural diplomacy. One example is through establishing a centre of cultural diversity in EU capitals. Another is through developing an ‘Islam and Citizenship Education in Europe’ Programme.

The proposals on their own are unlikely to lead to a new strategic relation between the EU and Turkey and the accession process. But cooperation in the areas of cultural and science diplomacy represents at least a test of the prospects for greater cooperation in other areas of what is one of the EU’s most fraught but important relationships.

Mapping EU and Member State Cultural and Science Diplomacy in a Regional Context

Work Package 5 looked at the importance between cultural and science diplomacy and regional and inter regional processes.

Findings

In terms of strategy, neither culture nor science was found to be at the centre of EU external relations and still constitute a relatively low priority. If not integrated into the EU’s regional foreign policy approach, it risks remaining an isolated, under-resourced policy area.

Reflection is needed on the potential for culture and science as cooperation-enabling topics, in contrast with competitive economic visions opposing national STI systems, especially in close-to-market technologies. Indeed, culture and science diplomacy can be norm or interest-driven, but the two drivers are not mutually exclusive. For example, EU health diplomacy can contribute to providing global public goods while also serving EU’s interests

In some instances, however, culture and science might represent fields of competing interests. This is the case of the tension between, on the one hand, profit-driven scientific innovation, and, on the other, access to and diffusion of scientific solutions to global challenges in fields like health (e.g. access to medicines) or climate change (e.g. renewable energy). This calls, for example, for the EU to consider more carefully these aspects in its trade policy, starting from broader social impact assessments of its trade agreements and design of balanced solutions protecting both human rights and security while at the same time, enhancing the profitability of private scientific research.

Similar tensions can be found in culture. Cultural relations can show a competitive character in unilateral displays of national prestige, or stepping up EU visibility, for example in the post-Soviet space, where the persisting influence of Russia is hardly challenged by EU initiatives. The EU regards culture in external relations as a tool for dialogue with partner countries, co-ownership and co-creation of programmes, human and social development and capacity-building. It has however shown a parallel fascination for the more competitive idea of cultural diplomacy as a display of European culture prowess to advertise and polish the EU’s image in a unilateral way.

The partnership arrangement with EUNIC signed in May 2017 constitutes a step towards inclusive cultural relations that values intercultural dialogue and development cooperation for their own sake rather than simply acting as an instrument of European foreign policy objectives. However, also bottom-

up international cultural relations can ultimately serve EU's political and security goals, by enhancing cultural and human development.

In practice, the EU has been increasingly developing a regional relevance to its cultural and science diplomacy, especially in the past two decades. Among the principal targets of these initiatives have been EU neighbourhood countries, with regional programmes and other initiatives in culture, higher education and science.

Regional arrangements struggled to take off in the Eastern Neighbourhood, however Euro-Mediterranean activity has produced a better structured cooperation reflecting the more bilateral approach undertaken by the EU. The EU's scientific and cultural attractiveness worked best in bilateral relations. This often has to do with:

- General political tensions and historical grievances within regions;
- The perception of the EU as a source of money rather than a partner. Indeed, funds that are provided bilaterally give greater room for manoeuvre to recipient countries; and
- Scientific cooperation and transfer of knowledge; learning from the EU is often perceived as more important than cooperating with peer countries in the region.

EU cultural, science, economic and health diplomacy with the South are mostly embedded in unequal relationships based on donor-recipient logics. Where there are less intra-regional political tensions, e.g. Latin America, scientific cooperation has allowed for stronger inter-regional approaches.

A key challenge for culture and science diplomacy is that the political goals for regional cooperation are disproportionate to the resources mobilised. Besides budget, limitations are also evident in short-term programming: funding instruments last on average 3-5 years without a commitment for predictable and stable assistance. The unreliable nature of EU's support to cultural and scientific actors in developing countries clashes with the rhetoric of long-term capacity building and development.

Opportunities include:

- Formalising the role of culture and science diplomacy as a soft power action in EU foreign policy could distinguish the EU from more traditional foreign powers and leverage the attractiveness of its cultural and scientific sectors.
- Placing culture and science diplomacy in the context of broader support to civil society and development policies in third countries. While directly targeting civil society is important – also to create regional cooperation and networking 'from the bottom' (e.g. workshops and networking events for cultural and scientific actors) – a long-lasting development of capacities in these sectors can only be achieved with the active inclusion of local governments in policy 'dialogues' (EU-civil society in culture/science-government authorities).
- A system of stronger co-funding from countries targeted by EU culture and science diplomacy, possibly taking as a model the new born PRIMA initiative, based on contributions from all participating countries.
- Increasing use of private-public partnerships for programme delivery. Although these partnerships are not being grasped as strongly as they might and should be in areas such as higher education for example.

Analysis & Recommendations

If the EU desires a regional approach to cultural and science diplomacy, it should be undertaken with a cooperative mindset, but with awareness that the relationship between culture and science on the one hand political and economic interests on the other can engender competition. In such competitive settings, EU's leadership should reflect a preference for science-based solutions to global challenges, rather than short-term economic and political expediency.

EU cultural diplomacy should be as inclusive and open to co-creation as possible, using culture as a tool for human, political and economic development of target regions.

The EU should privilege and dedicate more resources to inter-regional approaches, as these facilitate more equal partnerships with developing countries in contrast to more traditional donor-recipient relationships. Objectives and resources should be brought closer to each other, with more specific regional strategies and better-endowed and longer-lasting regional programmes. Co-funding of the instruments of EU culture and science diplomacy should be accompanied by more involvement of private actors (e.g. private foundations, companies).

Evaluating And Promoting Cultural And Science Diplomacy Practices

The core focus of our final work package was to identify several ways to translate research outcomes into policy recommendations and actions. Specifically, new research undertaken involved (i) assessing perceptions and practices of science diplomacy amongst scientific coordinators of H2020 projects and (ii) the preparation of a discursive foresight analysis.

Findings

The academic or policy language of science diplomacy that have been developed in recent years were mostly unfamiliar to the coordinators of other H2020 projects, even those with international engagement at government and policy level. That said, most coordinators we consulted recognised the H2020 programme to be both a scientific *and* diplomatic initiative, citing consortium requirements, along with the goals of EU cohesion and competitiveness agendas. Further, the more senior the scientists, the more readily they understood the need to engage with the diplomatic and policy implications of their project, albeit not being necessarily versed in, or indeed sympathetic to, the language of diplomacy.

Science and innovation projects are increasingly international, by virtue of breadth of skills and resources required by the growth of “big science” and the increasingly global nature of problem solving. Scientists operate within international peer groups and in international collaborations. Generally (although it may be only implicitly understood) potential benefits to international relationships, beyond the specific outcomes of the project *per se*, are not considered. Scientific and operational needs take precedence when assembling collaborating partners. In many cases, consortia were built from existing scientific networks and relationships.

Our research found that there is a strong belief that scientists must operate with ‘clean hands’ and for the benefit of society. There is much scepticism about projects becoming loaded with a political (short term) agenda that might not be in the best interests of the science. But overall, our consultations revealed that scientists were more receptive than anticipated to the purpose and value of science diplomacy, albeit with the provision that they are not diplomats and that the skill sets are vastly different. Need was expressed for:

- Externally: better early understanding of cultural issues and political sensitivities in collaborating partner regions that may influence project management and outcomes. For example, ease of negotiating scientific processes, such as access to resources, including national data (e.g. health records), or receptivity to outcomes (e.g. genetically modified insects).
- Internally: increased understanding of the EU’s own policy processes, for e.g. clarity on how to contribute expertise to relevant policy, confusion regarding access to resources and personnel within the Commission.

Analysis & Recommendations

Whilst acknowledging the need for science to operate independently, there is significant potential upside to providing appropriate policy and political context, increasing capacity and relevant skills in some segments of the scientific community. Particularly as science approach market readiness, when science and technology applications have a hard impact in economic and societal terms, often with attendant policy or regulatory implications. Even at earlier TRLs (*technology readiness levels*) successful deployment of science requires engagement with a multiplicity of policy, industry, government and community stakeholders.

The Commission can take steps to improve the ability of scientists to contribute to the diplomatic effort and policy conversation by:

- Raising awareness of the political and diplomatic context and ensuring that coordinators have access to appropriate briefs regarding any political or diplomatic sensitivities in countries in which they may be operating; particularly countries external to the EU.
- Clarifying the deliverables and ensuring that Calls are specific regarding actions or outcomes that could contribute to the foreign policy agenda of the EU, or a member state.
- For scientists leading major international projects, it might be appropriate to consider training in relevant skills to enhance their diplomatic capability.
- Increasing transparency and access to the policy making process, so that science can better make its contribution.
- Improving communication between the Commission and member states in order to optimise the opportunities for diplomatic impact by increasing awareness at member state level of the

major scientific achievements and projects being undertaken within the European framework programmes.

However, in any efforts by the Commission to engage its scientists in diplomatic efforts, the halo of neutrality that enables science to function as a diplomatic tool, and the credibility of science and scientists as unbiased experts, must be protected.

Emerging Domains of EU External Action

In contrast to cultural relations, the development of an EU science diplomacy has to-date followed a logic relying on existing instruments mostly managed by the European Commission and agencies, without seeking for a strong involvement of member states. Science diplomacy was mainly endorsed within DG RTD and based on existing EU policy in research and innovation. It became synonymous with the attachment of greater external policy goals to EU funding instruments in R&I, chiefly the framework programmes, and their increased opening to third countries. While this facilitated a (slightly) more rapid deployment of resources in support of a new policy it is not without its own dangers. Given the EU's much larger financial and technical means in R&I compared to culture, there could be a longer term. Should member states feel excluded from this process, especially in the current political climate and having the word *diplomacy* involved, chances that they will axiomatically support a common approach in the long term could prove problematic.

The future of EU international cultural relations and science diplomacy will depend on factors that, for analytical purposes, can be bifurcated as internal and external to the EU. In reality, these are interdependent and transcend political borders.

International Cultural Relations And Cultural Diplomacy

On the global level, hard power seems to be re-gaining prominence over soft power and persuasion following that brief period of soft power blossoming in the post-Cold War *détente* era. Acts of soft power (and propaganda)—in the framework of growing nationalist and identity politics—see culture increasingly regarded as a set of national features *defined in oppositions to others*, rather than a tool for dialogue and cooperation. This has seen a desire, and in some instances practice, of more political control over cultural institutes and similar institutions to serve national interests through traditional cultural diplomacy, rather than inclusive cultural relations. This takes place in a context where international cultural relations and digital transformation have radically undermined the gatekeeping power of traditional cultural institutions in the organisation of cultural exchanges and communication between people in different countries with the aspirational hope to influence their mutual perceptions (see Rose, 2017).

Within the EU, a reflection of these global nationalist and identitarian trends identified in much EL-CSID is accompanied by the rise of political forces opposed to the further sharing of competences across policy fields. Yet the willingness among member states to engage in enhanced cooperation and define a strategic framework remains fundamental to a more joined up approach to international cultural relations. The retreat of some EU member states from liberal values and the poor handling of existential moral issues like the recent refugee crisis also question the nature of future external engagement in the field of culture. This risks undermining the EU's self-assigned image as a normative and civilian power.

This is the case not only within the EU but also in the eyes of foreign audiences, especially in developing countries. Facing these challenges, a range of scenarios can be identified:

- (i) Firstly, and in an ideal context, the EU could maintain an internal consensus on enhanced cooperation in international cultural relations in a favourable global context, where developing and emerging countries recognise the value of culture as a tool for development and mutual engagement. This would reflect the EU's position to defend global multi-cultural and multi-lateral priorities reflected in the EU's 2016 *Global Strategy* statement.
- (ii) Secondly, and alternatively, an internal consensus might instead see the use of CD as a tool for showcasing and influence, if not propaganda, by most countries. Yet even in this case, EU's best option remains investing in international cultural relations to establish the EU as a pole of attraction for emerging countries and independent cultural actors in fields like development cooperation. However, the EU could also find itself in a situation where there is a lack of internal consensus and where the potential for inclusive cultural relations progressively, at best, limited at the global level. This would leave it to some key individual member states to play an ICR role externally but would hinder the development of a truly European approach.

- (iii) Thirdly, in a situation where both internal and external contexts become stages for cultural competition, there will be little role for joined up EU international cultural relations. A re-orientation of EU autonomous instruments in fields like development cooperation, trade and cultural policy (e.g. Creative Europe) might still reserve a small space for EU as opposed to member state activity as long as the current institutional structures are maintained rather than disestablished.

Thinking through forward looking lenses would suggest that investing in stronger EU cooperation in international cultural relations, rather than cultural diplomacy, remains the best solution for EU leadership to champion cultural diversity and cultural dialogue. Such a suggestion however assumes that the line between international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy can be easily identified. As revealed by the 2015 survey on the external perception of EU policies (EC, 2015), the EU is not perceived as a self-standing cultural actor. There is no single EU culture or persona to showcase.

The cooperative and mutual character of international cultural relations as a tool to build trust and mutual understanding thrives best when free of political control and political labels. It behoves the Commission to present itself as a non-intrusive supporter and convener of cultural exchanges. Supra-national bodies, and the European Union in particular, offer one possible answer to the question of location. The tightening lock of national government policy, in some cases at least, over cultural relations could in principle be loosened by collaboration, partnership and a pooling of resources (subject to agreed subsidiarity principles) under the *ægis* of the EC (Rose, 2017: 2).

Of course, for it to be international cultural relations as opposed to cultural diplomacy, the actors engaged in enhanced cooperation in ICR should not be limited to member states. A lasting and resilient approach requires the inclusion of actors at all levels besides the Brussels-based European networks of foundations, museums, theatres and more. Activating the interest and participation of national and local cultural actors in the emergence of a new European cultural policy is fundamental for its definition and successful implementation.

Finally, developing an innovative and effective new external policy in the field of culture requires the putting in place of a *continuing reflection* on the constantly evolving impact of international communication technologies and digital transformation on cultural relations. To date, this reflection has been almost non-existent but can no longer be avoided unless the EU wants to develop a strategic approach for a simply 'physical' cooperation, which would become increasingly limiting in the next decades. The EU's international relations needs to be played out on the web as much as on the chessboard (see Slaughter, 2018).

Science Diplomacy

Similar external contexts affect the potential development of an EU science diplomacy to those which affect cultural relations. Unprecedented challenges like climate change, global health and food security require concerted science-based cooperative solutions. These seem increasingly harder to achieve in contexts where populist movements discredit scientific evidence as a basis for policy making (e.g. the US administration concerning man-made climate change) or where scientific and technological progress is read in a purely market driven competitive way. In particular, while basic research offers relatively uncontroversial grounds for cooperation, as research and development get closer to the market competition, rigid mind-sets tend to emerge. Unfortunately, this is taking place within a broader context of decline of Post-WWII liberalism and free trade identified in research in Work Package 1 of EL-CSID (see Higgott, 2018). One opportunity resides with changing power balances: Asian, African and Latin American countries affected by the social and environmental challenges of economic and population growth, opens an opportunity of new leaderships in creating a global consensus on the use of science to tackle global problems. Their active involvement in multilateral policy-making can and should be facilitated by the EU (Trobbiani and Hatenoer, 2018).

Any EU policy consensus should include the scientific and research communities while at the same time preserving the independence of scientists. Equally important is the search for a convergence of EU member states towards a strengthened EU science diplomacy. A lack of a consistent strategy shared by the EU and its member states and differences in STI capacities among member states could substantially undermine EU's credibility and impact abroad. Developing debate and co-creation on EU science diplomacy beyond DG RTD—which to-date has privileged internationalising existing funding instruments—is required. This needs to include member states in the Council, other DGs dealing with external relations, EEAS and the European Parliament if a truly multi-level approach shared by all stakeholders is to be developed.

In an optimal scenario, growing global consensus on the need for science-based solutions would be matched by the activation of member state interests in a common approach to science diplomacy, backed by the scientific community and stakeholders at all levels. This would open a role for EU leadership in multilateral fora building trust with developing and emerging countries in view of resolving common challenges (identified in the research in trans-national networks in work package 3). Alternatively, and not unrealistically in the current era, EU's progressive development of a common approach could take place, but in an increasingly negative environment in a global arena where competitive as opposed to cooperative visions of science and innovation prevail.

In the short term, the European Commission sees the evolution of a joined-up science diplomacy as synonymous with the international opening and tailoring towards the external objectives of its funding programmes in R&I. However, a longer-term approach aiming at a multi-level EU science diplomacy approach to global challenges needs to aim at enhanced cooperation with and among member states in a shared European approach. But should member states be presented one day with a forward leaning approach to science diplomacy developed by Brussels based EC services, chances are high that they could meet it with resistance as a challenge to their competences. The EU must be also wary of the re-emerging tendencies around the world and indeed within its own borders, to exert political control over science, affecting both its independence and credibility. Therefore, it should avoid transforming science into a political battlefield with populist and anti-liberal governments.

Building New Diplomacies: Strategic Concepts or Communication Labels?

While developing practical instruments for cultural and science diplomacy, the EU should take due consideration of the strategic communications implications of using the word *diplomacy* with science and culture. While it may allow for better strategic thinking on the role of culture and science in foreign policy, the value of the terms as public labels for practical initiatives is still unclear often for both professionals and non-professionals at a one and the same time. In a context where EU member states tend to protect their national prerogatives in foreign policy; scientists and cultural actors guard their intellectual independence from political influence; and foreign audiences in developing countries are wary of European influence, the word *diplomacy* in cultural and science cooperation insensitive communications might prove to be counter-productive. This has been largely understood concerning culture, and the enhancement of *international cultural relation*—as opposed to the use of cultural diplomacy—is the concept of choice. However, ambiguities remain. the EU has not completely renounced the term CULTURAL DIPLOMACY. This slight of hand is not accepted in all quarters where international cultural relations that have *any* government involvement are deemed in effect to be cultural diplomacy by another name. In the field of science diplomacy these issues have yet to be confronted. It is not settled wisdom that using the term *diplomacy* has no negative connotations for science. For some, such labelling and communicating contributes to the undermining of the perceived neutrality of science.

Addressing the Impact of Technology and Big Data

The necessity of deploying EU level hard and soft power to manage societal issues not only arises from, but is continuously influenced by emerging technologies and the growing power of big data. This has recently been demonstrated by coordination and efforts to achieve passage of the GDPR legislation. It is clear that the EU has a role to play at all levels; legislative, transactional and diplomatic, to protect the interests of member states in this arena, in ways that cannot be achieved individually.

Member states are also preparing for the future. The EU might take a leaf from the book of Denmark, and its appointment of a digital ambassador to GAFA. This appointment acknowledges the diplomatic nature of engagement with the US data and technology giants whose financial size, business policies and decisions can directly affect state wellbeing. EU diplomatic as well as direct economic engagement will be essential as the impact of technological developments in big data, AI and the Internet of Things become part of our daily landscape.

With regard to ICR, developing an innovative and impactful new external policy in the field of culture means that a reflection must take place on the adaptation of cultural relations to ICT and digital transformation. Technology offers unprecedented opportunities for the development of ICR due to its capacity to reach a global audience, increase awareness of each other's cultural backgrounds, and create new business models. This has been almost inexistent in the current debate on ICR but cannot

be avoided unless the EU wants to develop a strategic approach for a simply 'physical' cooperation, which would become increasingly limiting in the next decades.

Conclusion

EL-CSID has run as a research project for three years. In that time, it has generated (i) a substantial corpus of high-quality research (documented in the Annexes) and (ii) a series of what we judge to be significant findings, of both a generic and a specific nature, concerning EU international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy on the one hand and science and innovation diplomacy on the other. Both are identified in the body of this Report. By way of Conclusion we restate our general key findings but also ask several as yet unanswered questions regarding the future of those areas that have been the focus of attention in the Report. Specifically, we consider the degree to which EU standing as a global actor has increased as a result of its activities in the domains of international cultural and science relations.

The Question Of Leadership

EL-CSID's focus has been not only on cultural, innovation and science diplomacy, but as its full name - *European Leadership in Culture, Science and Innovation Diplomacy*—indicates, also on European leadership. Throughout the project the concept of leadership has not been as fully articulated as have the concepts of culture and science. Leadership has probably been too easily assumed rather than identified and argued. Mostly we have preferred to frame leadership as a question within which *willingness to act* as a leader is measured against the EU's *capacity* to act (Zwartjes, Van Langenhove, Kingah & Maes, 2012). *Willingness* and *desire* are very much political questions while *capacity* is very much an institutional organisational consideration. On the basis of EL-CSID research a judgment may be made that leadership has been forthcoming in cultural relations, innovation and science contexts, but it has done so with varying degrees of success and in the face of increasing structural difficulties. We say how below.

Moreover, given the dramatic nature of wider socio-political change that has occurred both within Europe and the international order, and which we have chronicled in much of our work since the project's inception, we should also offer some final observations as to the effect of cultural and science diplomacy as strategies and practices affecting the EU's standing as a global actor. We do so with a caveat. Any such analysis is not easily amenable to quantitative measurement of these affects. Rather we must contain ourselves to identifying what we think are the observable trends that have emerged during the life of the project and offer some educated prognostications for the future on the basis of these trends.

So the generic question is: how would we recognise leadership and how would we analyse European success in this domain? The specific questions – the “EL-CSID questions” in global context – are:

- (i) To what degree have attempts by the EU to develop new strategies and practices in the domain of cultural and science diplomacy assisted the EU's best endeavours to mitigate the negative effects of the deteriorating international environment in which it now operates?
- (ii) To what extent can we answer the “leadership” question present in the very title of this project? That is, to what extent has and do the Brussels institutions and actors show leadership in the enhancement of Europe's international cultural relations and science diplomacy in support of the EU's external position?

The obvious first point to make – assuming that EL-CSID researchers are not victims of cultural and science diplomacy's equivalent of the “red car syndrome”, that is the more you research a topic the more you find it – is that in terms of *volume*, ICR, cultural diplomacy and science and innovation diplomacy as activity and practice have increased during the life of the project. This assertion is borne out in the empirical narrative of European activity we have identified in EL-CSID's research. Thus to this extent, in quantitative terms – we have seen leadership from Europe in the domains of cultural relations and science diplomacy.

In quantitative terms – during the life of the project, we have seen Europe continue to expand its endeavours in the domains of cultural relations and science diplomacy, but the key issue is the quality and the effectiveness of that leadership. Here we would argue the results, and the future potential of the strategic activity of the EU as an actor in these domains is, at best, ambiguous. We should consider the context of leadership and the concept of leadership in two forms:

At the political level, it is clear that based on a range of indicators (especially at the level of rhetorical political discourse) the High Representative for External Relations, H.E Federica Mogherini has carried the torch for an increasing role for cultural relations in the EU's approach to external relations more generally. Similarly, Carlos Moedas, the Commissioner for Research Science and Innovation, albeit perhaps with less public vigour than the High Representative, has carried the torch for enhancing the EU's approach to science diplomacy.

At the organisational level the degree to which the personal political leadership has borne fruit is reflected in practice and especially the degree to which institutional structures have been put in place to advance strategy in these areas. Here our judgment is more muted. With regards **competence and guidance**, culture is still a competence of the member states and is currently lacking a standard set of guidelines for the organisation and implementation of cultural relations on the European level. This can lead to confusion and miscommunication as to who should be the main actors, their roles, and how to proceed.

But some progress has been made in identifying an infrastructural base to advance a "strategic approach". Progress towards the instantiation of a structure of governance of the development of international cultural relations has evolved from the ongoing discussion between the EEAS, the Commission and institutional actors in the cultural domain, most notably the European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC). While EUNIC was initially set up as an enabling network it has become clear that it is one of the few actors that holds the potential to act as a mobilizing agent for ICR. The main difficulties in implementation are to be found in;

- (i) A lack of guidance from the top down; specifically, the identification of a formal role for the EEAS;
- (ii) A lack of funding commensurate with the rhetorical support.

With regard to (i), the role of the EEAS is still to be definitively determined. Some members of the EEAS expressed a desire that it steer all national cultural and foreign affairs policies. Culture should therefore be one of its main competences. But they have yet to convince other actors involved in cultural relations that need their own narrative through which they can exert influence and soft power. The EEAS wants a bolder communication and strategy for the future. To be precise, the EEAS does not 'just' want a space for cultural relations; it also wants a role for cultural diplomacy in the support of EU soft power via the assertion of EU values. It wants to spread the EU model and principles through cultural relations. But it recognizes some inherent difficulties that need to be addressed; specifically, the polarizing effect on any wider understanding of EU values in an era of growing polarization with the EU exacerbated by the growing strength of the "illiberal members of the EU".

With regards to (ii), while member-states traditionally donate a great deal of funds towards their own traditional cultural diplomacy platforms, they have yet to transfer substantial funding to the new strategic cultural relations approach designed in Brussels. At the time of the preparation of this report funds have been doubled for the European Houses of Culture project and new instruments are anticipated to be available during 2019 (for a more international dimension to the Creative Europe Programme). But only as 2019 proceeds apace will it be known if substantial funds will be made available to underwrite a more forward leaning approach to international cultural relations.

We also assumed that by definition successful *leadership* implies the acceptance of *followership* (see Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 1991) on the part of those that EU strategy and policy is seeking to influence; that is, the success of initiatives developed by leaders must be judged by the responses of would-be recipients. EL-CSID research in EU partner countries—notably Turkey, Kazakhstan and certain MENA countries—showed the degree to which attempts to enhance EU international standing as a result of initiatives in international cultural relations needed to be understood in a nuanced and country specific context. Success has clearly been more moderate than aspirations. While not the subject of specific EL-CSID research the one area of international cultural relations that can be said to be uncontested in its highly positive acceptance rate amongst EU partners countries is the support for higher education (both scholarships and in-country training support) under the auspices of the ERASMUS programme.

Our study of international cultural and science relations suggest that it is seen as a central pillar of EU soft power—noting here that soft power is a concept that we have used sparingly in our research given its essential illusiveness. Our use simply reflects its use of by actors in cultural diplomacy. If the basis of soft power is persuasion supported by national appeal and attraction (Nye 2004) but also communication, then it is a policy front on which the EU continues to have its work cut out for it. One of our core conclusions is that as the influence of populism and national continues to grow, the EU will have to better communicate the benefits of the soft power elements of its 2016 *Global Strategy*.

Communication remains an Achilles heel for the Brussels institutional community. As a recent study has shown, it is at the level of communication of big ideas that Brussels is at its weakest—both within the borders of the Union and external to it (see Papagiannenas, 2017). The inability to engage Europe’s citizens in its various strategic priorities—such as its stated commitment to a “liberal order”—is clearly one of Brussels most serious limitations. The EU must communicate to all citizens and partners the societal benefits of the European project, especially the rights and freedoms inherent in liberal values. If the EU really wishes to defend its values it should do so with vigour. We are in danger in the current era of forgetting the significance and importance of the European story to-date. The EU was a 20th century economic and socio-political success story without equal that has developed out of the rubble of two world wars yet as Papagiannenas (2017: 160 notes the EU “... *does not have a face*”. *It does not communicate a coherent message well, either internally or externally. Neither its citizens nor its partners are fully appraised of its strengths* (as opposed to its weaknesses) (see Maia Davis Cross and Melissen (2013)). As Davis Cross and Melissen presciently noted in 2013:

“As far as the EU does engage with the rest of the world, the problem is that communication is too often based on one-way informational practices rather than true dialogue. EU member-state governments, still behaving as though state-based diplomacy remains the name of their age-old Westphalian game, should be more conscious of the strengths of Europe’s pluralistic and multi-level governance environment. Sharing excellence in public diplomacy practices is in their own interest as well as that of other international actors in Europe” (Davis Cross and Melissen, 2013:1).

At the time of concluding this report it is clear that public diplomacy in general and cultural and scientific relations in particular remain minority and largely state-based interests and have done little to address the lacunae in the EU’s external image. An EU strategic approach to international cultural relations that does not include a highly developed and joined-up communication strategy is always likely to struggle—especially if strategy lags behind the pace of development in the delivery of information in the digital communication age. One-way informational messaging from Brussels agencies—as we have identified in several of our research products and papers—evokes reminders of colonialism and does not play well in the modern age (see Carta, 2017 and Senocak, 2018). Such an approach is limited when up against sophisticated manipulators of social media; especially in the hands of modern populist movements.

Addressing the PNZ Beyond the Life of EL-CSID

The report has indicated how our research has chronicled the impacts of the rise of populism and nationalism on EU external relations immediately prior to, and during the life, of the EL-CSID project. What it has not done is make any judgment on the continuing impact of these factors beyond the life of the project. Such a comment is not, however, inappropriate and this Conclusion is the place to make it.

There was debate within the EL-CSID consortium as to the degree of impact of populism, nationalism and the challenges to the contemporary global order on EU policy. We agreed that at this stage no definitive position could be adopted. We did however recognise that several trends had firmed that will make the international environment in which the EU pursues its international cultural relations and science diplomacy more, not less, difficult. Two in particular should be emphasised here in this forward look.

Firstly, the future shape of the EU, as not only a socio-political organising concept for its 28 (or more likely 27) member states, but also for the EU as an actor in international relations will be, as the title of Frederik Erikson’s recent *Spectator* article argues subject to: “A populist surge in the May 2019 elections... [that]...could change the face of the EU for ever” (Erixon, 2019). At the time of writing this report, the degree to which recent populist electoral success in European national elections might translate into similar electoral success in the forthcoming European parliamentary elections is also in question. One does not have to assume an emerging coherence across the various European populist movements, the agitation of US provocateurs such as Steve Bannon notwithstanding, to recognise the impact on Brussels’ endeavours to secure a greater coordination in the EU’s international cultural relations of further populist electoral success with its negative implications for joined up policy emanating from Brussels in the cultural domain. To the extent that the power of culture is currently recognised it is largely in the negative sense present in the PNZ rather than, despite the EU’s aspirations, as a potentially powerful force to enrich the EU’s international relations by providing the necessary insights into the virtues of the EU.

Indeed, the very leitmotif of much populist behaviour is that culture (and by extension cultural relations) are distinct and not for *coordination*. The values of the likes of Marine le Pen, Victor Orban or Matteo Salvini are the anti-thesis of the liberal values that have become embedded in EU discourse over the

last 50 years. The populists and the leaders of the central European illiberal democracies (now including Romania) are by definition nationalists, not champions of an ever closer or joined up policy making in Brussels. In what amounts to an emerging Euro-sceptic alliance, an alliance very much on the offensive, while they might not want to see the end of the EU they do want to change its direction, re-assert national diversity and rein in Brussels overreach across the policy spectrum in a manner which diminishes the very ideas of a European and global liberal approaches to a range of crucial policy areas that have driven Brussels in recent decades: note the 2019 attempts to kick start a “Warsaw-Rome” axis and Orban’s call for an anti-immigrant takeover of the Brussels institutions (Hopkins, 2019). None of this bodes well for joined up policy on international cultural relations or indeed science. Orban for example has now extended his influence over the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to secure greater influence over what is taught and researched in Hungary.

Secondly, the impact of the relationship between the USA and China on the rest of the world, including Europe, is yet to be determined. Should it turn out to be no more than a trade war its negative impact on Europe is bad enough. Should it, however, be the precursor of a new Cold War, as it is increasingly argued in commentary quarters ranging from the merely prudential through to the alarmist, then the magnitude of its impact cannot at this stage be determined save perhaps to note that while the softer diplomacy of international cultural relations will remain salient it is likely to play a secondary role to the more traditional material (security and economic) dimensions of international relations and foreign policy.

If the US China relationship further deteriorates beyond the poor state of relations that exists as this report is completed, then the implications for third parties who have close links with both China and the USA are severe. This includes states ranging from Australia thru to Singapore but most notably the European Union. Maintaining relations with both the erstwhile hegemon and the emerging great power will prove to be the major foreign policy issue for EU in the coming years. Steering a course between the two without making a formal choice between either will be the EU’s major diplomatic challenge in the years to come as the global centre of gravity continues to accelerate in its move away from the Atlantic towards the Pacific.

So, the question of European leadership in the field of cultural and science diplomacy can be considered in the following ways: (i) the EU indeed has a potential to develop a capacity in these areas. EL CSID has demonstrated this. (ii) For that capacity to develop requires an acceptance of it amongst Member States and to carve out a collective niche that complements the actions currently undertaken at national levels. Again, we have provided some evidence that this process is actually taking place. (iii) But for that there needs to be a greater willingness to do so. This willingness, we have shown, is present to a greater or lesser extent in some quarters of the cultural relations and science policy communities in Brussels. Some first steps have already been taken in the design of a strategic approach to international cultural relations. Less progress has been made to date in the field of science. Innovation in cultural and science diplomacy must be led by Brussels but will only flourish if it accords a greater role in this process of leadership to the scientific and cultural communities it purports to represent.

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- Ana B. Amaya and Stephen Kingah (2016), “What is necessary for effective EU leadership that can promote (inter) regionalism in Science and Cultural Diplomacy with the South?”, EL-CSID blog note, 3.
- Luk Van Langenhove (2016), “Science Diplomacy: New Global Challenges, New Trend”, EL-CSID blog note, 2.
- Luk Van Langenhove (2016), “Towards an EU Strategy for Cultural and Science Diplomacy that is integrated in the wider Foreign and Security Policy”, EL-CSID blog note, 1.

Annex 3 – Events organised by EL-CSID

Event	Location	Date
EL-CSID Kick-off or First Annual Dissemination Conference (D7.6)	Brussels	12/05/2016
<p>The Kick-Off Conference of the EL-CSID project was aimed at presenting the EL-CSID research agenda to the academic and policy communities as well as at gaining insights into the stakeholders' views and expectations. It was organised into two sessions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Session One – Roundtable Discussion on “European Cultural and Science Diplomacy: Policy Demands and Challenges” – provided room for interaction among the EL-CSID researchers and EU officers and policy-makers. • Session Two – Academic Panel on “European Cultural and Science Diplomacy: An Agenda for Research” – offered a platform for the EL-CSID researchers to discuss the early steps of their research on cultural and science diplomacy with an academic audience. <p>This early discussion provided the EL-CSID consortium with a valuable opportunity to further refine its perspectives on cultural, science and diplomacy and ensure the academic and policy relevance of its agenda. The event was held in the context of the biannual EUJA Conference, organised by the Institute of European Studies - VUB. The detailed programme of this first dissemination event can be consulted here.</p>		
EL-CSID Second Annual Dissemination Conference on “A Science Diplomacy approach for Belgium” (D7.7)	Brussels	01/12/2016
<p>The Second Annual Dissemination Conference of the EL-CSID project reflected on “A Science Diplomacy approach for Belgium?”. It brought together experts and practitioners with an interest in science, innovation, international cooperation and diplomacy with a view to discussing existing science diplomacy practices and approaches around the world, and to reflecting on a science diplomacy strategy for Belgium. This event was jointly organised by the Institute for European Studies (IES), the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office (BELSPO), the Department Economie, Wetenschap & Innovatie (EWI) and Wallonia-Brussels International (WBI). The conference material can be consulted on the EL-CSID website: conference booklet, powerpoint presentations and final conference report.</p>		
EL-CSID First Research Workshop at ISA Annual Convention (D5.6)	Baltimore	24/02/2017
<p>The First EL-CSID Research Workshop was held at the 58th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in Baltimore, Maryland. The workshop on “Health Policy Innovation, Science Diplomacy, and Economic Diplomacy” explored the linkages between health policy innovation in emerging countries and its implications for science and economic diplomacy with countries in the North, namely the European Union. EL-CSID researchers from UNU-CRIS and the University of Warwick presented their ongoing research on the topic and received useful feedback from the audience. The workshop was organised by UNU-CRIS.</p>		
EL-CSID First Training Workshop on “New Approaches to Diplomacy” (D6.4)	Brussels	19/04-24-05/2017
<p>The First Training Workshop on Diplomacy for Science and Culture was organised by the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), in collaboration with the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). It consisted of a series of six guest lectures delivered by academics and practitioners in the field of cultural, science and innovation diplomacy. The public lectures were addressed to both researchers and students with an interest in these issues. The programme and powerpoint presentations can be consulted on the EL-CSID website.</p>		
EL-CSID First Workshop on “Diplomacy and Development” (D3.7)	Malta	27-28/04/2017
<p>The First EL-CSID Workshop on “Diplomacy and Development” sought to investigate the role of cultural and scientific diplomacy with respect to global responses to pandemics, development and governance. It brought together analysts and practitioners from the EL-CSID consortium (VUB, UoW,</p>		

WZB, NU, EMUNI, CEDS and UNU-CRIS), the European University Institute (EUI) and the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC), among others. The [workshop programme](#) is available online for consultation. This event was organised by Nazarbayev University, in collaboration with the University of Warwick and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel.

EL-CSID Panel on “Challenges in Global Policy Making: The Practice Turn in the New Diplomacy”	Singapore	30/06/2017
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The EL-CSID Panel on “Challenges in Global Policy Making: The Practice Turn in the New Diplomacy” (T05P06) was held at the third International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP), organised by the International Public Policy Association (IPPA) in conjunction with the National University of Singapore (NUS). No less than eight EL-CSID papers were presented at the panel. These can be consulted below:

- [Culture and Science Diplomacy in the 21st Century. Can we Talk of a Practice Turn?](#) (Richard Higgott & Luk Van Langenhove, VUB)
- [The Emergence of Hybrid Diplomacy](#) (Jean-Christophe Bas, Advisory Board member)
- [Advance Diaspora Diplomacy in a Networked World](#) (Elena Douglas & Diane Stone, UoW)
- [Linking Culture, Security and Diplomacy in the EU: A Bridge or a Bridge Too far?](#) (Richard Higgott, VUB)
- [The European Union as an Actor in Global Education Diplomacy](#) (Silviu Piros & Joachim Koops, VUB)
- [Emerging Practices of Diplomacy for Science in Europe: Tensions and Potentials?](#) (Nicolas Rüffin & Uli Schreiterer, WZB)
- [The practice of Science and Cultural Diplomacy studied from the Positioning Theory angle](#) (Luk Van Langenhove & Melanie James, VUB)

This EL-CSID panel prompted an extremely useful exchange of views among the EL-CSID researchers and with an informed academic audience. The panel description and papers can be consulted on the [IPPA website](#) (T05P06). The papers presented at the ICPP will be published in a Special Issue.

Workshop “Innovation Policy and International Relations: directions for EU diplomacy”	Brussels	4/10/2019
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This workshop, organised by the JIIP Institute, aimed to gain a better insight into the conceptual and practical understanding of innovation policy and diplomacy. The insights gained in this event (which gathered several high-level policy-makers and scientific advisors) were used for the Foresight Analysis Report that was produced by JIIP some months later.

EL-CSID First Policy Briefing on “Enhancing the EU’s International Cultural Relations: The Prospects and Limits of Cultural Diplomacy” (D7.10)	Brussels	23/10/2017
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The First EL-CSID Policy Briefing on “Enhancing the EU’s International Cultural Relations: The Prospects and Limits of Cultural Diplomacy” was organised in Brussels. The aim of this event was to make an assessment of the opportunities and constraints facing those who would seek to support EU external relations via the enhancement of international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy. The event discussed the policy recommendations formulated in the [EL-CSID policy paper](#) on “Enhancing the EU’s International Cultural Relations” written by Prof. Richard Higgott (Vrije Universiteit Brussel). The event was promoted on Twitter with the hashtag [#EUculturalrelations](#).

EL-CSID Second Policy Briefing on “Science Diplomacy in search of a purpose in the Populist Era” (D7.11)	Brussels	20/03/2018
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The Second EL-CSID Policy Briefing on “Science Diplomacy in search of a purpose in the populist era” was organised in Brussels. The aim of this event was to make an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing Science Diplomacy today and of the prospects for the development of a Science Diplomacy approach. The event discussed the policy recommendations formulated in the EL-CSID policy brief 4 authored by Luk Van Langenhove and Elke Boers (Vrije Universiteit Brussel and United Nations University). The event was promoted on Twitter with the hashtags [#EU](#) [#ScienceDiplomacy](#).

EL-CSID Second Workshop on Diplomacy and Development (D3.8)	Brussels	14-15/ 05/2018
<p>The Second EL-CSID Workshop on “Diplomacy and Development: Trends and Challenges for Europe and Its Partners” sought to investigate the role of cultural and scientific diplomacy with respect to the foreign policy ambitions of the EU and its member states. Discussion also covers other forms of the “new diplomacy”. The workshop brought together over 30 academics and practitioners from leading universities and organisations in Europe and Kazakhstan and also the representatives from the European Commission. It was organised by Nazarbayev University, in collaboration with the University of Warwick and the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and took place at the Warwick Brussels Office.</p>		
Second EL-CSID Research Workshop (D5.7)	Brussels	18/05/2018
<p>The Second EL-CSID Research Workshop gave the opportunity to the EL-CSID project researchers from various work packages and external experts to present their ongoing research to an informed audience. It was delivered in the form of an interactive panel on “EU science diplomacy: Supporting regionalism in the South” organised by the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) and held at the Conference on “The European Union in International Affairs VI” in Brussels.</p>		
EL-CSID Third Annual Dissemination Conference (D7.8) & High-level Workshop (D6.6)	Brussels	05/2018
<p>Due to budgetary and practical reasons, it was decided to postpone the Third Annual Dissemination Conference and the High-Level Workshop and to organise them within the Final Dissemination Conference (D7.9). However, two panels on EU Cultural and Science Diplomacy were presented during the EUIA Conference in May 2018.</p>		
Strategizing Cultures of Security With the support of EL-CSID and the UK Embassy in Berlin	Berlin	28/09/2018
<p>The aim of the workshop was two-fold: (i) Facilitate a process of reflection on definitions of security terms from numerous perspectives, first European and U.S., then African: not to force one definition but to identify how we accommodate key terms and words having different meanings?, and (ii) Contribute to ongoing policy and military debates as these ambiguous definitions are converted into political policies and military instructions, especially as they (will) apply beyond Europe and in Africa in particular. The workshop tied into EL-CSID insofar as it emphasizes the contributions of diplomatic language and process in order to define the scope and manoeuvrability in and for Europe as it engages with itself and beyond in the realms of state and human security in particular.</p>		
EL-CSID Second Training Workshop (D6.5)	Brussels	Nov 2018
<p>Two research workshops on Cultural and Science Diplomacy were organised in November 2018, one on Cultural Diplomacy (12.11) and one on Science Diplomacy (22.11). More information and links to documents can be found in the Participant Portal; D6.5.</p> <p>12/11/2018: The seminar on “A Strategic Approach to The EU's International Cultural Relations: Implementation in AaTime of Existential Challenge” was organised by EL-CSID itself and discussed the EU’s strategy to culture in external relations during a closed session with participants from the EU and cultural institutes. An official, targeted invitation was sent out, and all participants received a Brief of the discussion afterwards by e-mail. It was also included in the January 2019 EL-CSID newsletter.</p> <p>22/11/2018: For this day, two Science Diplomacy activities were scheduled:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 22/11/2018 Morning Session: Through cooperation between the RTD and the EEAS, a training session on Science Diplomacy at the EEAS Headquarters was organised in the 		

morning. It was managed between the three H2020-funded Science Diplomacy sister projects: S4D4C, InsSciDE, and EL-CSID.

- 22/11/2018 Afternoon Session: a debrief was made possible and organised by the RTD in the framework of the Science Counsellors Week. The three project coordinators had the possibility to start an open discussion with the science counsellors under Chatham House rules. A common post was later written and posted on the science-diplomacy.eu website.

Dissemination Workshop “Pandemic Response: New Thinking in Global Health Policy and Governance”	Warwick	19-20 Feb 2019
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This dissemination workshop, organised by senior researchers Franklyn Lisk and Annamarie Bindenagel Sehovic, is taking place on 19-20 February at the University of Warwick.

The focus of the workshop is on the (global) response to pandemics, specifically HIV/AIDS and Ebola, which has been a major aspect of global health and development policy over the past three decades for HIV and more recently Ebola. The purpose of the workshop is three-fold: a) to present our findings as per overall pandemic response, introducing new thinking in global health policy and governance as impacted and influenced by the interaction of science, political governance and cultural diplomacy; b) to compare and contrast the specific experiences and evidence in Liberia and Sierra Leone with Ebola, and in South Africa with HIV; and c) to collate lessons learned towards a more equitable, coordinated and rational global health governance and policy.

Annex 4 – Programme EL-CSID Final Conference

Against the Nationalist Tide:
A Role for EU Cultural and Science Diplomacy?

FINAL CONFERENCE OF

EL-CSID: The H2020 Project on European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy

27 February 2019
Centre de Conférences Albert Borschette (CCAB),
Rue Froissart 36,
Brussels

09.00-09.30 – registration & coffee

09.30-10.00: Session I – Opening Session

Silvio Gonzato - Director for Strategic Communications, Parliamentary and Legal Affairs at
the European External Action Service

Prof. Luk Van Langenhove - Scientific Coordinator EL-CSID, Institute for European Studies, Vrije
Universiteit Brussel

10.00-11.00: Session II – Presentation and Discussion of the Final Report “EU Cultural and Science Diplomacy in an Era of Nationalist Introspection”

Prof. Richard Higgott, University of Warwick & Institute for European Studies, VUB and
Virginia Proud, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Chair: Jean-Christophe Bas, CEO and Chairman of the Global Compass, CEO of DOC research
institute

11.00-11.30 – Coffee break



This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme under grant agreement No 693799.

11.30-13.00: Session III – High Level Round Table Dialogue of Cultures “EU Cultural and Science Diplomacy from the Outside: Comments and Provocations”

Speakers from

China: Prof. Xinning Song, Director Confucius Institute VUB

Turkey: Prof. Selin Senocak, Centre d'Études Diplomatiques et Strategiques and UNESCO Cultural Diplomacy Chair Holder

Kazakhstan: Prof. Neil Collins, Nazarbayev University

South-Africa: Prof. Andrew Bradley, former Director of International IDEA

Chair: Prof. Luk Van Langenhove

13.00-14.00 – lunch

14.00-15.15: Session IV – Panel on EU Cultural Relations and Diplomacy

Papers by

Prof. Toby Miller, University of California and Murdoch University

Prof. Caterina Carta, Université Laval, Québec

Riccardo Trobbiani, United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies

Dr. Andrew Murray, Vesalius College

Chair: Prof. Richard Higgott



15.15-16.30: Session V – Panel on Science and Innovation Diplomacy

Papers by

Prof. Diane Stone, University of Warwick

Dr. Ulrich Schreiterer, WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Dr. Jos Leijten, Joint Institute for Innovation Policy

Prof. Yee-Kuang Heng & Nobuyuki Sakai, Graduate School of Public Policy,
University of Tokyo

Chair: Prof. John Wood, Chair of the Advisory Board of ATTRACT, former Secretary
General at the Association of Commonwealth Universities

16.30-17.00 – Coffee Break

**17.00-18.00: Session VI – Higher Education as an Instrument of European Cultural and Science
Diplomacy**

Papers by

Prof. Richard Higgott, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Prof. Joachim Koops, Scientific Director Institute of Security and Global Affairs, University of Leiden
& Silviu Piros, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Chair: Prof. Jan Danckaert, Vrije Universiteit Brussel

18.00 – Drinks



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The EL-CSID project
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