Shifts in Russia’s and China’s nuclear posture introduce a strategic dilemma for the United States and NATO, yet there are no demand signals from European leaders to fundamentally alter NATO’s nuclear posture. In this respect, Dual Capable Aircraft continues to be seen by NATO as essential to maintaining a credible deterrent against either conventional or nuclear aggression. This In-Depth Paper assumes that the United States will continue to provide Europe with a “nuclear umbrella” but it offers, against this baseline, three options that face NATO in terms of its own organised and commanded Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapon (NSNW) deterrent force. These options are: 1) modernise and enhance Dual Capable Aircraft within the parameters that have governed the Alliance’s policy towards Russia since 1996-1997; 2) revise these policy parameters to allow a geographic expansion eastward of Dual Capable Aircraft to include so-called “new” allies; or 3) augment the strengthening of Dual Capable Aircraft taken under either option 1 or 2 with new US NSNW systems to be placed under NATO command and control. Following an exploration of these three options, the In-Depth Paper shows how NATO can better maintain alliance solidarity by avoiding the divisive introduction of new nuclear systems.
